A widespread view in the philosophy of mind and action holds that intentions are propositional attitudes. Call this view ‘Propositionalism about Intention’. The key alternative holds that intentions have acts, or do-ables, as their contents. Propositionalism is typically accepted by default, rather than argued for in any detail. By appealing to a key metaphysical constraint on any account of intention, I argue that on the contrary, it is the Do-ables View which deserves the status of the default position, and Propositionalism which bears the burden of proof. I go on to show that this burden has not been met in the literature.

中文翻译：

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关于意图的命题主义：转移举证责任

心灵和行动哲学中的一个广泛观点认为，意图是命题态度。将此观点称为“关于意图的命题主义”。关键的替代方案认为，意图具有作为其内容的行为或可做事。命题主义通常被默认接受，而不是在任何细节上争论。通过诉诸对任何意图解释的关键形而上学约束，我认为恰恰相反，应有的默认立场是可行观点，而承担举证责任的是命题主义。我继续表明，文献中没有解决这个负担。