It has recently been argued that a sensitivity theory of knowledge cannot account for intuitively appealing instances of higher-order knowledge. In this paper, we argue that it can once careful attention is paid to the methods or processes by which we typically form higher-order beliefs. We base our argument on what we take to be a well-motivated and commonsensical view on how higher-order knowledge is typically acquired, and we show how higher-order knowledge is possible in a sensitivity theory once this view is adopted.

中文翻译：

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高阶知识和敏感性

最近有人争辩说，知识的敏感性理论不能解释直觉上吸引人的高阶知识实例。在本文中，我们认为它能够一旦仔细注意我们通常形成高阶信念的方法或过程。我们将我们的论点建立在我们所认为的关于通常如何获得高阶知识的动机良好和常识性的观点上，并且我们展示了一旦​​采用这种观点，高阶知识在敏感性理论中是如何可能的。