Can artworks be morally good or bad? Many philosophers have thought so. Does this moral goodness or badness bear on how good or bad a work is as art? This is very much a live debate. Autonomists argue that moral value is not relevant to artistic value; interactionists argue that it is. In this paper, I argue that the debate between interactionists and autonomists has been conducted unfairly: all parties to the debate have tacitly accepted a set of constraints which prejudices the issue against the interactionist. I identify two demands which are routinely placed on arguments seeking to establish interaction and argue that they are, in fact, mutually conflicting.There are two upshots. First, in light of this, it is unsurprising that arguments for interaction have failed to meet with everybody’s satisfaction. The constraints are such that no argument can meet them. Second, recognizing this helps us uncover a new, promising, but hitherto overlooked strategy for establishing artistic-ethical interaction.

中文翻译：

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艺术伦理互动辩论的两个教条

艺术品在道德上是好是坏？许多哲学家都这么认为。这种道德上的好坏是否与作品的好坏有关作为艺术？这是一场现场辩论。自治主义者认为道德价值与艺术价值无关；互动主义者认为它是。在本文中，我认为互动论者和自治论者之间的辩论是不公平的：辩论的所有各方都默认了一系列限制，这些限制因素使该问题对互动论者产生偏见。我确定了两个要求，它们通常被放在寻求建立互动的论点上，并认为它们实际上是相互冲突的。有两个结果。首先，有鉴于此，互动的论点未能让每个人都满意也就不足为奇了。约束是如此之大，以至于没有任何论据可以满足它们。其次，认识到这一点有助于我们发现一种新的、有前途的、但迄今为止被忽视的建立艺术伦理互动的策略。