Abstract The implications of incommensurability for rights’ adjudication tend to be overlooked in much of contemporary constitutional theory. This paper criticizes the dominant “one right-answer” approach to conflicts of rights, and develops an alternative approach that is better suited to constitutional rights’ adjudication in contemporary pluralistic legal orders. It is submitted that the normative reasons for having courts undertake the value-choices implicit in constitutional rights’ adjudication, and for preferring certain legal methodologies over others, must reflect the role of courts in resolving social disputes in the light of specific aspects of the economic, social, and legal life of the polities in which those courts operate. It is further argued that any theory that builds from this approach needs to answer two inter-related questions: when is constitutional rights’ adjudication by courts appropriate, and how rights’ adjudication should be pursued.

中文翻译：

---

全世界权利审判的规范和制度层面

摘要在现代宪法理论中，不可通约性对权利裁决的影响往往被忽视。本文批评了占主导地位的解决权利冲突的“一个正确答案”的方法，并提出了一种更适合当代多元法律秩序中宪法权利裁定的替代方法。有人认为，让法院进行宪法权利裁决所隐含的价值选择，以及相对于其他法律方法更偏爱某些法律方法的规范性理由必须反映出法院在解决经济纠纷方面的作用。法院运作所在的政治，社会和法律生活。进一步认为，任何以此方法为基础的理论都需要回答两个相互关联的问题：