Abstract Scholars often appeal to Kant in defending a retributivist view of criminal punishment. In this paper, I join other scholars in rejecting this interpretation as insufficiently attentive to Kant's wider theory of justice, particularly as found in the Rechtslehre, a section of the Metaphysics of Morals. I then turn to the Tugendlehre, where I examine analogies between Kant's treatments of morality and justice. In particular, I argue that Kant's own views about conscience and moral cognition should cause us to rethink the importance of lex talionis (an integral retributive principle) in the criminal justice system, and to adopt a more merciful attitude toward punishable criminals than we might otherwise be inclined to do. I end with a few policy proposals aimed at encouraging such moral cognition in contemporary Anglo-American criminal justice systems

中文翻译：

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刑事处罚中的道德认知

摘要学者经常呼吁康德捍卫分配主义的刑事处罚观点。在本文中，我和其他学者一起拒绝接受这种解释，因为这种解释对康德的更广泛的正义理论没有足够的重视，尤其是在道德形而上学的著作《律法》中。然后，我转到图根德尔勒（Tugendlehre），在这里研究康德对待道德和正义的类比。特别是，我认为，康德对良心和道德认知的看法应该使我们重新思考“刑法”（刑法不可分割的原则）在刑事司法系统中的重要性，并对我们应受惩罚的罪犯采取比我们其他方式更为仁慈的态度。倾向于做。