What exactly do we need in order to enjoy the cognitive benefit that is supposed to be provided by an explanation? Some philosophers (most notably Khalifa in Philos Sci 79(1):15–37, 2012, Episteme 10(1):1–17, 2013, Eur J Philos Sci 5(3):377–385, 2015, Understanding, explanation, and scientific knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017) would say that all that we need is to know the explanation. Others (e.g. Newman in Int Stud Philos Sci 26(1):1–26, 2012; Strevens in Stud Hist Philos Sci Part A 44(3):510–515, 2013) would say that achieving understanding with the help of an explanation requires more than that, that it requires a grasping or an understanding of the explanation. My aim in this paper is to come up with a new answer to this problem by exploring the shortcomings of the received view of understanding. In my view, besides having (at least) testimonial knowledge of an explanation, obtaining explanatory understanding requires full cognitive access to the explanation.

中文翻译：

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我们如何借助解释来获得理解？

为了享受应该由解释提供的认知益处，我们究竟需要什么？一些哲学家（最著名的是 Khalifa in Philos Sci 79(1):15-37, 2012, Episteme 10(1):1-17, 2013, Eur J Philos Sci 5(3):377-385, 2015, 理解、解释和科学知识，剑桥大学出版社，剑桥，2017 年）会说我们所需要的只是了解解释。其他人（例如 Int Stud Philos Sci 26(1):1-26, 2012 中的 Newman；Stud Hist Philos Sci Part A 44(3):510-515, 2013 中的 Strevens）会说在解释的帮助下实现理解需要的不仅仅是这些，它需要对解释的掌握或理解。我在这篇论文中的目的是通过探索公认的理解观点的缺点来为这个问题找到一个新的答案。在我看来，