Currently, most research studies focus on ownership reforms and governance reforms, while only a few research studies focus on management system innovations. Based on an evolution of state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) performance appraisal systems, this paper investigates the influence of performance appraisal system on earnings management.,Using a natural experiment that central government-owned enterprises (CGOEs) carried out economic value-added performance appraisal (EVA-PA) in 2010, the authors adapt difference-in-difference method to analyze the relationship between EVA-PA and earnings management choice. Furthermore, the authors consider the situation which contained financial status, separation between decision-making rights and decision-control rights, separation between ownership and control and industrial characteristics.,The research finds that after carrying out EVA-PA, CGOEs prefer accrual-based earnings management to real earnings management, and there is substitution effect between the two types of earnings management. Moreover, further research studies reveal that enterprises suffering losses in the previous year and featuring higher separation between decision-making rights and decision-control rights and higher separation between ownership and control have stronger earnings management motive under EVA-PA. In contrast, enterprises achieving satisfactory financial performance in the previous year and engaging in businesses within protective industry have weaker earnings management motive under EVA-PA. After the implementation of EVA-PA, accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management both impair operating performances of CGOEs.,Theoretically, this paper enriches research studies on earnings management from the perspective of incentive mechanism and expands research studies on economic consequences of EVA-PA. In addition, it validates the relationship between the two types of earnings management. As an important mechanism of corporate management and control, performance appraisal system is an important part for establishing ownership management system and improving internal management system of SOEs.

中文翻译：

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新的绩效评估系统（EVA）是否会影响收益管理？

当前，大多数研究集中在所有权改革和治理改革上，而只有少数研究集中在管理体制创新上。基于国有企业绩效考核体系的演进，本文研究了绩效考核体系对盈余管理的影响。通过自然实验，中央政府对国有企业进行了经济增值。在2010年绩效评估（EVA-PA）中，作者采用差异法分析了EVA-PA与盈余管理选择之间的关系。此外，作者考虑的情况包括财务状况，决策权与决策控制权之间的分离，所有权与控制权之间的分离以及产业特征。研究发现，在执行EVA-PA之后，CGOE相对于实际收益管理更喜欢基于权责发生制的收益管理，并且两种收益管理之间存在替代效应。此外，进一步的研究表明，在EVA-PA下，上一年度遭受亏损并且决策权与决策控制权之间的距离较高，所有权与控制权之间的距离较高的企业具有更强的盈余管理动机。相反，在EVA-PA下，上一年财务表现令人满意的企业并从事保护性行业的企业的盈余管理动机较弱。实施EVA-PA后，应计制盈余管理和实际盈余管理都会损害CGOE的经营业绩。本文从激励机制的角度丰富了盈余管理的研究内容，并扩展了对EVA-PA经济后果的研究。此外，它验证了两种类型的收益管理之间的关系。绩效考核制度作为公司管理和控制的重要机制，是建立所有权管理制度和完善国有企业内部管理制度的重要组成部分。