The relationship between war and state formation is a central topic in the social sciences. While scholarship on interstate war posits that conflict triggers extractive processes that build the state, research findings on the effects of intrastate war are more mixed, often suggesting that civil war inhibits extraction and induces state decay. This study, however, posits that the negative relationship between civil war and revenue extraction is not underpinned by institutional destruction but by the wartime introduction of undermining rules that structure behavior in ways that subvert taxation. To illustrate this claim, it traces the evolution of undermining rules within the customs administration at the height of the Guatemalan armed conflict. As the perceived escalation of the insurgent threat created institutional ambiguity, newly empowered political-military elites implemented alternative procedures for capturing customs revenues, which systematically undermined the state’s extractive capacity. Comparing this case with one of reinforcing rules that bolster extraction, I posit that the broad or narrow nature of the rule-making coalition explains divergent paths of wartime institutional development. Overall, this study uncovers the inner workings of the counterinsurgent state and illustrates how civil war dynamics induce processes of institutional change that can have long-term effects on state performance.

中文翻译：

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内战、制度变迁和国家刑事化：来自危地马拉的证据

战争与国家形成之间的关系是社会科学的中心话题。虽然关于州际战争的学术研究假定冲突会触发建立国家的榨取过程，但关于州内战争影响的研究结果则更为复杂，通常表明内战会抑制榨取并导致国家衰败。然而，这项研究认为，内战与收入提取之间的负面关系不是由制度破坏所支撑，而是由战时引入的破坏性规则来支撑，这些规则以颠覆税收的方式构建行为。为了说明这一主张，它追溯了危地马拉武装冲突最严重时期海关管理部门内部破坏性规则的演变。由于叛乱威胁的感知升级造成了制度上的模糊，新获得权力的政治军事精英实施了获取关税收入的替代程序，这系统地削弱了国家的采掘能力。将此案例与支持抽取的强化规则之一进行比较，我认为规则制定联盟的广泛或狭窄性质解释了战时制度发展的不同路径。总的来说，这项研究揭示了反叛乱国家的内部运作，并说明了内战动态如何引发制度变迁过程，从而对国家绩效产生长期影响。我假设规则制定联盟的宽泛或狭窄性质解释了战时制度发展的不同路径。总的来说，这项研究揭示了反叛乱国家的内部运作，并说明了内战动态如何引发制度变迁过程，从而对国家绩效产生长期影响。我假设规则制定联盟的宽泛或狭窄性质解释了战时制度发展的不同路径。总的来说，这项研究揭示了反叛乱国家的内部运作，并说明了内战动态如何引发制度变迁过程，从而对国家绩效产生长期影响。