This paper argues that foreign aid undermines tax compliance, and examines three causal mechanisms that may undergird this relationship: By leading the recipient state to under-invest in tax enforcement, substituting for the state in terms of service provision, or reducing state legitimacy. To test these arguments, the paper takes advantage of cross-national surveys on individual tax compliance. The results suggest that higher levels of foreign aid are associated with higher levels of refusals to pay taxes. The paper finds evidence that the causal mechanism is aid leading the state to reduce its enforcement of taxation, but not through the substitution of state services or decreasing state legitimacy. The results suggest that aid can have counter-productive effects for the long-term development of recipient countries by lowering the state’s enforcement of taxation, but not by weakening the relationship between state and society.

中文翻译：

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援助依赖：对外援助和税收合规的跨国分析

本文认为外援破坏了税收合规性，并考察了可能巩固这种关系的三个因果机制：导致受援国在税收执法方面投资不足，在服务提供方面替代国家，或降低国家合法性。为了验证这些论点，本文利用了关于个人税收合规性的跨国​​调查。结果表明，较高水平的外援与较高水平的拒绝纳税有关。论文发现的证据表明，因果机制是帮助导致国家减少税收执法，而不是通过替代国家服务或降低国家合法性。