Over the past half century, Chile has fluctuated wildly in terms of economic prosperity and democratic health. Using 78 surveys archived at the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, we document the evolution of Chileans’ perceptions of their personal, family, and national economic conditions during major political and economic changes. The data show that prior to the Pinochet dictatorship, despite a growing economic crisis, Chileans’ perceptions of their family’s economic situation—particularly among the lower socio-economic class—improved, suggesting that Allende’s social and economic policies may have had their intended effect. In contrast, through the democratic transition and the contemporary period, economic evaluations typically tracked objective economic conditions. We conclude by discussing how these patterns can inform public opinion research in Latin America and beyond. The public’s evaluations of the economy are thought to influence future economic conditions (e.g., Barsky and Sims 2012; Lahiri, Monokroussos, and Zhao 2016) as well as political factors, such as vote choice, presidential approval, congressional approval, trust in government, and regime stability (e.g., Holbrook 1994; Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997; Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Morrison 2009; Enns and Richman 2013). Yet, beyond the United States Peter K. Enns is an associate professor in the Department of Government and executive director of the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA. Jose T. Sanchez Gomez is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA. The authors thank Ryan Carlin, Gustavo Flores-Macias, Jana Morgan, Patricio Navia, Jenny Pribble, Ken Roberts, and Kathleen Weldon for helpful comments on previous versions of this article. Sanchez Gomez thanks the Andrew Kohut Fellowship at the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at Cornell University and the Herbert I. Flournoy Fellowship from Cornell’s Government Department. *Address correspondence to Peter K. Enns, Cornell University, Department of Government, 205 White Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853-7901, USA; email: peterenns@cornell.edu. Public Opinion Quarterly doi:10.1093/poq/nfz029 D ow naded rom http/academ ic.p.com /poq/advance-articleoi/10.1093/poq/nfz029/5554702 by AAPO R M em er Acess user on 31 Agust 2019 and a handful of other countries with advanced economies, we know relatively little about the dynamics of economic perceptions and how they relate to economic and political conditions. To highlight the value of considering other contexts, we use data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at Cornell University to examine more than a half century of Chilean economic attitudes. The data offer an unprecedented look at economic evaluations during economic booms and busts as well as democratic breakdown and revival. During the period of analysis, Chile transitioned from a democracy to a dictatorship (1973) and then back to a democracy (1990). The period also includes the 1972–1973 Chilean economic crisis, the late 1990s economic crisis in Latin America, the post-2008 global recession, and the contemporary period when Chile drastically reduced extreme poverty, more than tripled its economy, and joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. In addition to offering historical insight into economic perceptions in one of the most important economies of Latin America, Chile is an informative case because the extreme political and economic variation it experienced parallels the political and economic volatility of many other Latin American countries. Although scholars have analyzed a variety of historical public opinion data in Chile (Prothro and Chaparro 1974; Bermeo 2003; Madrid 2005; Carlin, Love, and Martinez-Gallardo 2015; Navia and Osorio 2015, 2017; Cabezas and Navia 2019), Chilean economic evaluations have received much less attention than economic attitudes in other Latin American countries (e.g., Kelly 2003; Carlin and Hunt 2015). We seek to build on this literature by offering a comprehensive overview of the Chilean public’s economic views. The patterns we highlight will also be of interest to public opinion scholars who focus on the United States and other advanced industrial democracies. The immense political and economic variation in countries like Chile allows an assessment of scope conditions of existing theories and opportunities to develop new theories about the causes and consequences of economic evaluations. For example, the relationship between economic conditions and vote choice in Latin America appears more complicated than in advanced democracies (Singer and Carlin 2013; Valdini and Lewis-Beck 2018). It is also possible that the political determinants of economic attitudes found in the United States (De Boef and Kellstedt 2004; Enns, Kellstedt, and McAvoy 2012) manifest differently in alternate institutional settings and in times of great political or economic change. The data we present could also speak to the generalizability of asymmetric responses to good and bad economic information (Soroka 2006, 2014) and whether economic opinion follows or leads economic news (Wlezien, Soroka, and Stecula 2017). This article first considers data prior to the Pinochet dictatorship (1966 to 1973), which includes the presidencies of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964– 1970) and Salvador Allende (1970–1973). We then evaluate the transition to democracy, defined here as the final two years of Pinochet’s dictatorship Enns and Sanchez Gomez Page 2 of 13 D ow naded rom http/academ ic.p.com /poq/advance-articleoi/10.1093/poq/nfz029/5554702 by AAPO R M em er Acess user on 31 Agust 2019 (1988–1990), the first democratic election (December 1989), and the period up to the end of the first democratic administration (March 1994). Last, we examine the period of democratic consolidation: 1994 to 2018. The analysis presented herein highlights how these surveys can offer important insights into the impact of Allende’s social and economic policies, how economic perceptions shift before and after major political transitions, and the relationship between economic conditions and perceptions across diverse political and economic climates. Political Shifts and Democratic Breakdown (1966–1973) This section examines economic evaluations from 12 surveys from 1966 to 1973 (CEDOP/Hamuy Polls, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research), a period that precedes the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. These years include the presidencies of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964–1970), from the Christian Democratic Party (center), and Salvador Allende (1970–1973), from the Popular Unity coalition (left).1 The surveys were conducted in the capital, Santiago, which included about 30 percent of the total population at the time.2 Although not shown here, the Roper Center also holds surveys conducted in the second (Valparaiso) and fourth (Viña del Mar) largest Chilean cities during this period. The data patterns in these cities largely parallel the results for Santiago. Figure 1 reports Santiago residents’ evaluations of their families’ retrospective economic situation compared to the previous year. This question, which was the only economic question during the period, asked: “Considering the last 12 months, would you say that your family has improved its economic situation, stayed the same, or worsened?” In figures 1–3, when more than one survey was conducted in a single year, we present the average of the surveys. The online appendix includes tables with all survey marginals.3 The years during Allende’s presidency (November 1970 to September 1973) are especially noteworthy. During this period, the increasingly positive views of family economic conditions moved opposite to deteriorating economic conditions. Economic growth, inflation, and the annual increase in real wages were all much better in 1970 than in 1972 and 1973. Specifically, in 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1973, the economic growth rates were 3.6, 8.0, –0.1, and –4.3; the annual inflation rates were 36.1, 22.1, 260.5, and 605.1; and the annual increases of real wages were 8.5, 22.3, –11.3, and –38.6 (Larrain and and a handful of other countries with advanced economies, we know relatively little about the dynamics of economic perceptions and how they relate to economic and political conditions. To highlight the value of considering other contexts, we use data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at Cornell University to examine more than a half century of Chilean economic attitudes. The data offer an unprecedented look at economic evaluations during economic booms and busts as well as democratic breakdown and revival. During the period of analysis, Chile transitioned from a democracy to a dictatorship (1973) and then back to a democracy (1990). The period also includes the 1972–1973 Chilean economic crisis, the late 1990s economic crisis in Latin America, the post-2008 global recession, and the contemporary period when Chile drastically reduced extreme poverty, more than tripled its economy, and joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. In addition to offering historical insight into economic perceptions in one of the most important economies of Latin America, Chile is an informative case because the extreme political and economic variation it experienced parallels the political and economic volatility of many other Latin American countries. Although scholars have analyzed a variety of historical public opinion data in Chile (Prothro and Chaparro 1974; Bermeo 2003; Madrid 2005; Carlin, Love, and Martinez-Gallardo 2015; Navia and Osorio 2015, 2017; Cabezas and Navia 2019), Chilean economic evaluations have received much less attention than economic attitudes in other Latin American countries (e.g., Kelly 2003; Carlin and Hunt 2015). We seek to

中文翻译：

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民意调查——智利 1966 年至 2018 年的经济评估和政治变化趋势

在过去的半个世纪里，智利在经济繁荣和民主健康方面波动很大。我们使用罗珀民意研究中心存档的 78 项调查，记录了智利人在重大政治和经济变化期间对其个人、家庭和国家经济状况的看法的演变。数据显示，在皮诺切特独裁统治之前，尽管经济危机日益严重，但智利人对其家庭经济状况的看法（尤其是社会经济较低阶层）有所改善，这表明阿连德的社会和经济政策可能已达到预期效果。相比之下，在民主转型和当代时期，经济评估通常跟踪客观经济状况。我们最后讨论了这些模式如何为拉丁美洲及其他地区的舆论研究提供信息。公众对经济的评价被认为会影响未来的经济状况（例如 Barsky 和 ​​Sims 2012；Lahiri、Monokroussos 和 Zhao 2016）以及政治因素，例如投票选择、总统批准、国会批准、对政府的信任、和政权稳定性（例如，Holbrook 1994；Durr、Gilmour 和 Wolbrecht 1997；Chanley、Rudolph 和 Rahn 2000；Acemoglu 和 Robinson 2001；Erikson、MacKuen 和 Stimson 2002；Morrison 2009；Enns 和 Richman 2）。然而，在美国以外，Peter K. Enns 是美国纽约州伊萨卡市康奈尔大学政府部门的副教授和罗珀公众舆论研究中心的执行主任。何塞·T。Sanchez Gomez 是美国纽约州伊萨卡市康奈尔大学政府系的博士研究生。作者感谢 Ryan Carlin、Gustavo Flores-Macias、Jana Morgan、Patricio Navia、Jenny Pribble、Ken Roberts 和 Kathleen Weldon 对本文先前版本的有益评论。Sanchez Gomez 感谢康奈尔大学罗珀民意研究中心的 Andrew Kohut 奖学金和康奈尔政府部门的 Herbert I. Flournoy 奖学金。*地址通信给 Peter K. Enns, Cornell University, Department of Government, 205 White Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853-7901, USA; 电子邮件：peterenns@cornell.edu。公众意见季刊 doi:10.1093/poq/nfz029 Dow naded rom http/academ ic.p.com /poq/advance-articleoi/10。1093/poq/nfz029/5554702 由 AAPO RM em er Acess 用户于 2019 年 8 月 31 日和少数其他发达经济体国家撰写，我们对经济观念的动态及其与经济和政治状况的关系知之甚少。为了强调考虑其他背景的价值，我们使用康奈尔大学罗珀民意研究中心的数据来研究半个多世纪以来智利的经济态度。这些数据提供了对经济繁荣和萧条以及民主崩溃和复兴期间的经济评估的前所未有的看法。在分析期间，智利从民主过渡到独裁（1973），然后又回到民主（1990）。这一时期还包括 1972-1973 年智利经济危机、1990 年代后期拉丁美洲的经济危机、2008 年之后的全球经济衰退，以及智利大幅减少极端贫困、经济增长两倍多并加入经济合作与发展组织的当代时期。除了提供对拉丁美洲最重要经济体之一的经济看法的历史洞察力之外，智利还是一个信息丰富的案例，因为它经历的极端政治和经济变化与许多其他拉丁美洲国家的政治和经济波动相似。尽管学者们分析了智利的各种历史民意数据（Prothro and Chaparro 1974；Bermeo 2003；Madrid 2005；Carlin, Love, and Martinez-Gallardo 2015；Navia and Osorio 2015, 2017；Cabezas and Navia 2019），与其他拉丁美洲国家的经济态度相比，智利的经济评估受到的关注要少得多（例如，Kelly 2003；Carlin 和 Hunt 2015）。我们试图通过全面概述智利公众的经济观点来建立在这些文献的基础上。我们强调的模式也会引起关注美国和其他先进工业民主国家的舆论学者的兴趣。智利等国家的巨大政治和经济变化允许评估现有理论的范围条件和发展关于经济评估的原因和后果的新理论的机会。例如，拉丁美洲的经济状况与投票选择之间的关系似乎比发达民主国家更为复杂（Singer 和 Carlin 2013；Valdini 和 Lewis-Beck 2018）。在美国发现的经济态度的政治决定因素（De Boef 和 Kellstedt 2004；Enns、Kellstedt 和 McAvoy 2012）也可能在不同的制度环境和重大政治或经济变革时期表现不同。我们提供的数据还可以说明对好的和坏的经济信息的不对称反应的普遍性（Soroka 2006, 2014），以及经济观点是跟随还是引导经济新闻（Wlezien、Soroka 和 Stecula 2017）。本文首先考虑了皮诺切特独裁统治（1966 年至 1973 年）之前的数据，其中包括爱德华多·弗雷·蒙塔尔瓦（Eduardo Frei Montalva）（1964 年至 1970 年）和萨尔瓦多·阿连德（Salvador Allende）（1970 年至 1973 年）的总统任期。然后我们评估向民主的过渡，此处定义为皮诺切特独裁统治的最后两年 Enns 和 Sanchez Gomez Page 2 of 13 D ow naded rom http/academ ic.p.com /poq/advance-articleoi/10.1093/poq/nfz029/5554702 by AAPO RM APO用户于 2019 年 8 月 31 日（1988-1990）、第一次民主选举（1989 年 12 月）以及直到第一次民主政府结束的时期（1994 年 3 月）。最后，我们考察了民主巩固时期：1994 年至 2018 年。本文提出的分析强调了这些调查如何为阿连德的社会和经济政策的影响、重大政治转型前后的经济观念如何转变以及两者之间的关系提供重要见解。不同政治和经济气候下的经济状况和看法之间的关系。政治转变和民主崩溃（1966-1973） 本节考察了 1966 年至 1973 年（CEDOP/Hamuy 民意调查，罗珀民意研究中心）的 12 项调查的经济评估，这一时期是奥古斯托·皮诺切特独裁统治之前的时期。这些年包括来自基督教民主党（中）的爱德华多·弗雷·蒙塔尔瓦（Eduardo Frei Montalva）（1964-1970）和来自人民团结联盟（左）的萨尔瓦多·阿连德 (1970-1973) 的总统职位。1 调查是在首都进行的, 圣地亚哥，其中包括当时总人口的 30% 左右。2 虽然此处未显示，但罗珀中心还在此期间在智利第二大（瓦尔帕莱索）和第四大（比尼亚德尔马）城市进行了调查。这些城市的数据模式在很大程度上与圣地亚哥的结果相似。图 1 报告了圣地亚哥居民对其家庭与上一年相比的回顾性经济状况的评估。这个问题是这一时期唯一的经济问题，他问：“考虑到过去的 12 个月，您认为您的家庭经济状况有所改善，保持不变，还是恶化？” 在图 1-3 中，当一年内进行了多项调查时，我们展示了调查的平均值。在线附录包括所有调查边缘的表格。3 阿连德担任总统期间（1970 年 11 月至 1973 年 9 月）特别值得注意。在此期间，对家庭经济状况日益积极的看法与不断恶化的经济状况相反。经济增长，通货膨胀，1970年实际工资年增长率均远高于1972年和1973年。具体而言，1970年、1971年、1972年和1973年经济增长率分别为3.6、8.0、–0.1和–4.3；年通货膨胀率为36.1、22.1、260.5和605.1；实际工资的年增长率分别为 8.5、22.3、–11.3 和 –38.6（Larrain 和其他一些经济发达的国家，我们对经济观念的动态及其与经济和政治状况的关系知之甚少. 为了强调考虑其他背景的价值，我们使用康奈尔大学罗珀民意研究中心的数据来检验半个多世纪以来智利的经济态度。这些数据提供了对经济繁荣和萧条以及民主崩溃和复兴期间的经济评估的前所未有的看法。在分析期间，智利从民主过渡到独裁（1973），然后又回到民主（1990）。这一时期还包括 1972-1973 年智利经济危机、1990 年代末拉丁美洲经济危机、2008 年后全球经济衰退，以及智利大幅减少极端贫困、经济增长两倍多并加入经济合作与发展。除了提供对拉丁美洲最重要经济体之一的经济看法的历史洞察之外，智利是一个信息丰富的案例，因为它经历的极端政治和经济变化与许多其他拉丁美洲国家的政治和经济波动相似。尽管学者们分析了智利的各种历史民意数据（Prothro and Chaparro 1974; Bermeo 2003; Madrid 2005; Carlin, Love, and Martinez-Gallardo 2015; Navia and Osorio 2015, 2017; Cabezas and Navia 2019），智利经济与其他拉丁美洲国家的经济态度相比，评估受到的关注要少得多（例如，Kelly 2003；Carlin 和 Hunt 2015）。我们寻求 Cabezas 和 Navia 2019），智利经济评估受到的关注远低于其他拉丁美洲国家的经济态度（例如，Kelly 2003；Carlin 和 Hunt 2015）。我们寻求 Cabezas 和 Navia 2019），智利经济评估受到的关注远低于其他拉丁美洲国家的经济态度（例如，Kelly 2003；Carlin 和 Hunt 2015）。我们寻求