The extent of local order varies widely in rebel held areas, from total chaos to well-run governing institutions. When these institutions exist, why do some include civilian input in local affairs, while others exclude civilians from governance? I argue that rebels choose different governing strategies that maximize their utility of territorial control, based on certain characteristics of civilian inhabitants populating the territory. Rebels’ constituency determines whether rebels seek to govern civilians or control them solely with coercive violence, and community cohesion (or lack thereof) then determines the type of institutions that rebels develop. I focus on three different outcomes for communities under rebel control—no institutions, exclusive institutions, and inclusive institutions. I test my argument using historical, statistical, and case evidence, leveraging original cross-national data on local order in rebel held territory as well as interviews with village heads, ex-combatants, and community members in Aceh, Indonesia.

中文翻译：

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反叛者占领区的社会地形

从完全混乱到运作良好的统治机构，叛乱地区的地方秩序范围差异很大。当这些机构存在时，为什么有些将平民投入地方事务，而另一些却将平民排除在治理之外？我认为，叛乱者根据居住在该领土的平民居民的某些特征，选择不同的统治策略，以最大限度地发挥其领土控制的作用。叛乱者的选区决定了叛乱者是试图统治平民还是仅通过胁迫性暴力来控制平民，而社区凝聚力（或缺乏凝聚力）则决定了叛乱者发展的机构类型。我将重点放在叛军控制下的社区的三种不同结果上：没有机构，独占机构和包容性机构。我使用历史，统计数据来检验我的论点，