Presidents have significant incentives to mislead the public about the use of force. Under what conditions are members of the public willing to hold presidents accountable for what they say about military action? This article examines both spin and deceit at the micro-level to clarify when individuals are most likely to punish presidents for misinformation. Three survey experiments demonstrate that presidents incur political costs for misinformation, even when operations succeed. Introducing partisanship into the analysis then reveals that not all individuals are equally likely to punish all presidents—Republican leaders primarily concerned with their base have the most leeway to mislead. The findings highlight the dynamic nature of democratic accountability and domestic constraints on military force. Rather than a static institutional feature, the strength of accountability can vary across presidents and electoral coalitions. Additionally, the results show political costs are not limited to large-scale deception—even spin generates backlash.

中文翻译：

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有限旋转：当公众惩罚对军事行动撒谎的领导人时

总统有重大诱因误导公众使用武力。在什么条件下，公众愿意让总统对他们所说的军事行动负责？本文从微观角度考察了自旋和欺骗行为，以澄清个人何时最有可能因错误信息而惩罚总统。三个调查实验表明，即使行动成功，总统也会因误传而招致政治损失。在分析中引入党派关系后发现，并非所有个人都同样有可能惩罚所有总统-主要关注其基础的共和党领导人最容易产生误导。调查结果强调了民主问责制的动态性质和国内对军事力量的限制。而不是静态的机构特征，问责制的力量在总统和选举联盟之间会有所不同。此外，结果表明，政治代价不仅限于大规模欺骗，甚至自旋也会产生反弹。