Threats and force, by increasing expected costs, should reduce the target’s resolve. However, they often seem to increase resolve. We label this phenomenon provocation. We review instances of apparent provocation in interstate relations and offer a theory based on the logic of reputation and honor. We also consider alternative explanations: confounding or mis-imputation of resolve; revelation of information, character, or capabilities; or generalized sunk cost reasoning. Using survey experiments, we systematically evaluate whether provocation exists and what may account for it. We employ design-based causal inference techniques—a hypothetical natural experiment, a placebo treatment, and ruling out mediators—to evaluate our key hypotheses. We find strong evidence of provocation and suggestive evidence that it arises from considerations of honor, vengeance, and reputation. Our experimental design minimizes the risk that this result arises from our alternative explanations.

中文翻译：

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胁迫与挑衅

通过增加预期成本，威胁和武力将降低目标的决心。但是，它们似乎常常会增加决心。我们将此现象标记为挑衅。我们回顾了州际关系中明显挑衅的情况，并提供了基于声誉和荣誉逻辑的理论。我们还会考虑其他解释：对解决方案的混淆或错误输入；信息，性格或能力的启示；或广义的沉没成本推理。通过调查实验，我们系统地评估了挑衅是否存在以及可能造成什么的原因。我们采用基于设计的因果推断技术（假设的自然实验，安慰剂治疗和排除介体）来评估我们的关键假设。我们发现挑衅的有力证据和暗示性的证据是出于对荣誉的考虑，复仇和声誉。我们的实验设计可最大程度地减少因我们的其他解释而产生此结果的风险。