Abstract This paper maps Leeper and Walker (2011) model into a game theory framework to study about the strategic aspects of monetary and fiscal interaction under a fiscal stress caused by an ageing population problem. The paper reveals that the outcomes of the game depend on the parameters of the underlying model, the size of the projected transfers and the public inflation expectation. The findings show that commitment to the target (inflation, government transfers) plays a crucial role in the policy interaction.

中文翻译：

---

博弈论框架下财政压力的货币后果

摘要本文将Leeper和Walker（2011）模型映射到一个博弈论框架中，以研究人口老龄化引起的财政压力下货币与财政互动的战略方面。本文揭示了博弈的结果取决于基础模型的参数，预计转移的规模和公众通胀预期。研究结果表明，对目标的承诺（通货膨胀，政府转移）在政策互动中起着至关重要的作用。