This essay explores Jung's thinking strategies, argumentation patterns, and concept formation processes, and reveals how they distinguish his work from normal present-day science. Jung doesn't much appreciate the law of noncontradiction, which is a cornerstone of classical logic, and he doesn't refrain from using openly ambiguous theoretical terms. It will be pointed out that not only specific archetypes, but the notion of archetype itself, as well as other of Jung's theoretical notions (energy, including libidinal energy, polarity, integration, wholeness, instinct, symbol, and so on), are consciously ambiguous and thus potentially contradictory. It is shown that this kind of dialectic research strategy and related contradiction-tolerant and ambiguity-tolerant methods connect his work to Post-Kantian German Idealism, Schelling's and Schopenhauer's philosophy in particular. However, it was Hegel who, in his Science of Logic, presented a systematic overview of such dialectic principles of reasoning, which were, in the 19th century, widely applied by German philosophers, theologians, and other scholars. Unfortunately, Jung decided not to study Hegel, but, instead, wrote derogatorily of his work. It will be argued that a Jungian who wants to be conscious of her own argumentation strategies and methods of concept formation should study Hegel's complex and sophisticated dialectical logic. In addition, it is suggested that Jungian depth psychology might help us to amend the phenomenological deficits of Hegel's system by providing it with a primal experiential source. This is needed because Hegel's Geist, due to its intellectual emphasis, is a self-conscious conceptual totality which advances progressively from stage to stage by guiding itself with the help of dialectical reason (Vernunft). It will be shown that if enriched with a proper kind of experiential givenness, which includes the Jungian unconsciousness (with libidinal energy, instincts, and archetypes), Hegelian metaphysics would be able to embrace a seriously aconceptual or preconceptual dimension. Aconceptual experience, which is, for Jung, mainly the instinctual layer of archetypes, remains essentially inaccessible, not only for normal scientific concepts, but for the concepts of any form of dialectics as well.

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歧义与矛盾：荣格辩证法概要

本文探讨了荣格的思维策略、论证模式和概念形成过程，并揭示了它们如何将他的工作与当今正常的科学区分开来。荣格并不十分欣赏作为经典逻辑基石的非矛盾律，并且他并没有避免使用公开的模棱两可的理论术语。需要指出的是，不仅特定的原型，而且原型本身的概念，以及荣格的其他理论概念（能量，包括力比多能量、极性、整合、整体性、本能、符号等），都是有意识的模棱两可，因此可能自相矛盾。表明这种辩证的研究策略和相关的矛盾容忍和歧义容忍方法将他的工作与后康德德国唯心主义、谢林'联系起来。特别是叔本华的哲学。然而，正是黑格尔在他的《逻辑科学》中对这种辩证法原理进行了系统的概述，这些原理在 19 世纪被德国哲学家、神学家和其他学者广泛应用。不幸的是，荣格决定不研究黑格尔，而是贬低他的著作。一个想要意识到自己的论证策略和概念形成方法的荣格应该研究黑格尔复杂而复杂的辩证逻辑。此外，有人认为荣格的深度心理学可能通过为黑格尔体系提供原始的经验来源来帮助我们修正黑格尔体系的现象学缺陷。这是必要的，因为黑格尔的精神，由于其对知识的强调，是一个自我意识的概念总体，它通过在辩证理性（Vernunft）的帮助下引导自己，从一个阶段到另一个阶段逐步推进。将会表明，如果丰富了一种适当的经验给定，其中包括荣格的无意识（具有力比多能量、本能和原型），黑格尔的形而上学将能够包含一个严肃的概念或前概念维度。概念经验，对于荣格来说，主要是原型的本能层，本质上仍然是不可接近的，不仅对于正常的科学概念，而且对于任何形式的辩证法的概念也是如此。包括荣格的无意识（具有力比多能量、本能和原型），黑格尔的形而上学将能够包含一个严重的概念或前概念维度。概念经验，对于荣格来说，主要是原型的本能层，本质上仍然是不可接近的，不仅对于正常的科学概念，而且对于任何形式的辩证法的概念也是如此。包括荣格的无意识（具有力比多能量、本能和原型），黑格尔的形而上学将能够包含一个严重的概念或前概念维度。概念经验，对于荣格来说，主要是原型的本能层，本质上仍然是不可接近的，不仅对于正常的科学概念，而且对于任何形式的辩证法的概念也是如此。