The purpose of this paper is to examine whether foreign directors’ influence on opportunistic behavior among managers varies between Islamic banks (IBs) and conventional banks (CBs). It also examines how religious ethics and morals guide foreign directors to be better monitors.,A panel fixed effects regression is used to analyze the effect of foreign directors on opportunistic behavior among managers in IBs and CBs. The authors use different proxies such as loss avoidance, discretionary loan loss provision and expense preference behavior to measure management opportunistic behavior.,Based on sample of 3,758 bank-year observations for 164 banks over the period 1993-2015, the authors show that the presence of foreign directors in IBs increases boards’ effectiveness in impeding management opportunistic behavior, whereas the presence of foreign directors in CBs reduces boards’ effectiveness in curbing management’s unethical acts. The authors also document that IBs (CBs) with foreign directors demonstrate less (more) earnings management and expense-preference behavior among managers. In addition, the authors’ evidence indicates that the existence of the Shari’ah supervisory boards helps foreign directors be more effective monitors.,The current study focuses on banks only which makes its results subject to sample bias; there are many other forms of financial institutions (e.g. investments, real-estates and mutual funds) complying to the Shari’ah law. Second, owing to the lack of foreign board directors characteristics, the authors cannot investigate the intensity of the specific characteristics that could have specific directions in affecting managerial behavior.,The findings in this paper may help standards-setters, auditors, investors and regulators take appropriate measures and create better policies that reduce managers’ discretion. This could in turn improve information transparency decision-making, monitoring, advising and accounting quality.,The authors’ theoretical framework combines the agency, contingency, resource-dependence, stewardship and stakeholders’ theories and applies them to Shari’ah as an alternative ethical and internal governance mechanism. The authors find that the impact of foreign directors on management opportunistic behavior depends on the corporate religious norms within boards of directors, in particular, suggesting that religious values affect how foreign directors influence bank managers’ behavior.

中文翻译：

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伊斯兰银行的外国董事和公司治理

本文的目的是研究外国董事对经理人投机行为的影响在伊斯兰银行（IB）和传统银行（CB）之间是否有所不同。它还研究了宗教道德和道德观念如何指导外国董事成为更好的监督者。面板固定效应回归用于分析外国董事对IB和CB经理中机会主义行为的影响。作者使用避免损失，酌处性贷款损失准备金和费用偏好行为等不同指标来衡量管理机会主义行为。基于1993-2015年间164家银行的3,758个银行年度观察值的样本，作者表明IB中外国董事的数量增加了董事会在阻止管理机会主义行为方面的有效性，而外国董事在可换股债券中的存在会降低董事会抑制管理层不道德行为的有效性。作者还证明，与外国董事的IB（CB）在经理中表现出较少（更多）的盈余管理和费用偏好行为。此外，作者的证据表明，伊斯兰教法监事会的存在有助于外国董事成为更有效的监督者。目前的研究仅针对银行，这会使其结果受到样本偏差的影响。还有许多其他形式的金融机构（例如投资，房地产和共同基金）遵守伊斯兰教法。其次，由于缺乏外国董事会特征，作者无法调查可能对管理者行为产生特定指示的特定特征的强度。本文的研究结果可能会帮助标准制定者，审计师，投资者和监管机构采取适当措施，并制定更好的政策来减少管理者的自由裁量权。这反过来可以提高信息透明度的决策，监控，​​咨询和会计质量。作者的理论框架结合了代理，偶然性，资源依赖，管理和利益相关者的理论，并将它们应用于伊斯兰教法作为替代伦理学。和内部治理机制。作者发现，外国董事对管理机会主义行为的影响取决于董事会内部的公司宗教规范，特别是，