In this essay, my aim is to explain Vātsyāyana’s solution to a problem that arises for his theory of liberation. For him and most Nyāya philosophers after him, liberation consists in the absolute cessation of pain (ātyantika-duḥkha-vimukti). Since this requires freedom from embodied existence, it also results in the absolute cessation of pleasure. How, then, can agents like us (who habitually seek pleasure) be rationally motivated to seek liberation? Vātsyāyana’s solution depends on what I will call the Pain Principle, i.e., the principle that we should treat all aspects of our embodied existence as pain. If we were to follow this advice, we would come to apply the label of pain (duḥkha-saṃjnā) to all aspects of our embodied existence, including pleasure. This would undermine our attachment to our own embodied existence. I show that this fits with Vātsyāyana’s general theory of motivation. According to this theory, by manipulating the labels (saṃjnā) using which we think about the world and ourselves, we can induce radical shifts in our patterns of motivation.

中文翻译：

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Vātsyāyana的解脱指南

在这篇文章中，我的目的是解释 Vātsyāyana 对解脱理论中出现的问题的解决方案。对于他和他之后的大多数 Nyāya 哲学家来说，解脱在于痛苦的绝对停止 (ātyantika-duḥkha-vimukti)。既然这需要从具身存在中解脱出来，它也会导致快乐的绝对停止。那么，像我们这样的代理人（习惯于寻求快乐）如何能够理性地寻求解放？Vātsyāyana 的解决方案取决于我称之为痛苦原则的东西，即我们应该将我们具体存在的所有方面都视为痛苦的原则。如果我们遵循这个建议，我们就会将痛苦 (duḥkha-saṃjnā) 的标签应用于我们有形存在的所有方面，包括快乐。这会破坏我们对自己具体存在的依恋。我表明这符合 Vātsyāyana 的一般动机理论。根据这个理论，通过操纵我们思考世界和我们自己所使用的标签（saṃjnā），我们可以引发我们动机模式的根本转变。