We investigate the phenomenon of corruption in an experimental setting. The first treatment studies the role of reciprocity in establishing corrupt relationships between two agents. Corruption occurs when public officials accept bribes and reward the briber at the expenses of others. The second treatment introduces two features that negatively affect bribery: increasing the cost of bribery and introducing the monitoring agents. In this case, corruption occurs when the monitoring agent conceals the observed bribe-exchange. The last two treatments disentangle the effects of the two features affecting bribery. Our results show that high bribery cost and the presence of monitoring agents curb corrupt behaviors mildly.

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我们在实验环境中调查腐败现象。第一种处理研究互惠在两个代理人之间建立腐败关系中的作用。当公职人员接受贿赂并以他人的利益为代价奖励贿赂者时，就会发生腐败。第二种处理方法引入了两个对贿赂产生负面影响的特征：增加贿赂成本和引入监控代理。在这种情况下，当监控代理隐瞒观察到的贿赂交换时，就会发生腐败。最后两种处理方式将影响贿赂的两个特征的影响分开。我们的结果表明，高额的贿赂成本和监控代理的存在可以温和地遏制腐败行为。

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