How should alliance patterns respond to changing relative power? If states ally against the greatest threat, they should switch alliances if a shift in relative power makes a new state more threatening than the previous adversary. For some states, a “threat transition” will occur when the risk of a preventive war from the declining state falls below the risk of a revisionist war from the rising state, prompting a switch from the rising to the declining state. Such a threat transition may occur before, after or even in the absence of a power transition, in which the second-ranked state overtakes the most powerful state in the system. I present a model of alliance choice over time with changing relative power that develops the dynamic balance of threat perspective. I then discuss US–Chinese–Russian relations as an illustration of the model.

中文翻译：

---

切换面：不断变化的实力，联盟选择和美中俄关系

联盟模式应如何应对相对权力的变化？如果各州结盟反对最大的威胁，那么如果相对权力的变化使一个新州比前一个对手更具威胁性，它们应该改变联盟。对于某些州，当下降状态的预防性战争的风险低于上升状态的修正主义战争的风险，从而促使从上升状态转变为下降状态时，就会发生“威胁过渡”。这种威胁过渡可能发生在电源过渡之前，之后甚至不存在，在这种情况下，排名第二的状态会取代系统中最强大的状态。我提出了随着时间的推移，随着相对能力的变化，联盟选择的模型，它发展了威胁观点的动态平衡。然后，我将讨论美中俄关系作为模型的说明。