Policies motivated by national objectives can have far-reaching international consequences in a highly interconnected world. These international externalities provide the basis for policy coordination and multilateral institutions. Backlash against globalization, however, has increased pressure on policymakers to step away from commitments to international cooperation and has undermined support for global institutions. The 19th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference of the IMF brought together researchers and policymakers to discuss “International Spillovers and Cooperation” on November 1–2, 2018. In his Mundell–Fleming Lecture, Raghuram G. Rajan (University of Chicago Booth and NBER) discusses the interplay between cross-border capital flows, exchange rates, and incentives for corporate borrowing in capital-receiving countries. Based on his joint work with Douglas W. Diamond (Chicago Booth and NBER) and Yunzhi Hu (University of North Carolina), Professor Rajan argues that easy monetary policy in funding countries increases the expected net worth of firms in capital-receiving countries and their ability to buy assets. Anticipating this higher liquidity for their assets, corporations in capital-receiving countries lever up; at the same time, the expected higher availability of funds in the future reduces the incentive to enhance the pledgeability of their assets. Firms therefore overborrow, and when monetary policy in source countries tightens, receiving-country exchange rates depreciate, and corporate liquidity dries up even if country prospects are sound. Given the externality of capital flows on incentives for corporate governance, Professor Rajan concludes that there might be a rationale for recipient countries to limit exchange rate movements to avoid spillovers from monetary policies in funding countries. Stephen G. Cecchetti (Brandeis International Business School) and IMF coauthors Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli, Machiko Narita and Ratna Sahay provide

中文翻译：

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国际溢出与合作

在高度相互联系的世界中，以国家目标为动力的政策可能会产生深远的国际后果。这些国际外部性为政策协调和多边机构提供了基础。然而，对全球化的强烈反对增加了决策者退出国际合作承诺的压力，并削弱了对全球机构的支持。国际货币基金组织第19届雅克·波拉克（Jacques Polak）年度研究会议于2018年11月1日至2日召集研究人员和政策制定者讨论“国际溢出与合作”。讨论了跨境资本流动，汇率和资本接受国企业借贷激励措施之间的相互作用。基于与道格拉斯·戴蒙德（Douglas W. Diamond）（芝加哥布斯和NBER）和胡云芝（北卡罗来纳大学）的联合研究，拉詹教授认为，资助国家的宽松货币政策增加了资本接受国及其企业的预期净资产。购买资产的能力。资本接受国的公司预料到资产将拥有更高的流动性，因此杠杆率上升。同时，预期未来更高的资金可用性会降低提高其资产质押性的动力。因此，公司超额借贷，当来源国的货币政策收紧时，即使国家前景良好，接受国的汇率也会贬值，并且公司的流动性也会枯竭。鉴于资本流动是公司治理激励措施的外部性，拉詹教授得出的结论是，受援国可能有理由限制汇率变动，以避免资助国货币政策的溢出效应。斯蒂芬·G·切奇蒂（Brandeis国际商学院）和国际货币基金组织的合著者汤玛索·曼奇尼·格里弗利，成田町子和拉特纳·萨海