Abstract Forward guidance can be provided as an unconditional promise, i.e. commitment to a specific low policy rate. Alternatively, the promise may include an escape clause, i.e. a condition defining the state of the economy under which the central bank would not keep such a low rate and, instead, it would revert to setting policy under discretion. The escape clause can be expressed as a threshold in terms of a specific variable. The present paper shows that, when such a threshold is expressed in terms of an endogenous variable (e.g. output, inflation), there are cases where it becomes impossible for the central bank to act in a way that is consistent with its promise. Consistency imposes limits on the policy rate that can be set since reverting immediately to the optimal discretionary rate can be incompatible with exceeding the threshold.

中文翻译：

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取决于国家的前瞻性指导和公告不一致的问题

摘要前瞻性指导可以作为无条件的承诺提供，即对特定低政策利率的承诺。备选地，承诺可以包括逃避条款，即定义中央银行不会保持如此低利率的经济状态的条件，取而代之的是，它将恢复为酌情制定政策。转义子句可以根据特定变量表示为阈值。本文表明，当以内生变量（例如产出，通货膨胀）来表示这种阈值时，在某些情况下，中央银行不可能以与其承诺相一致的方式采取行动。一致性对可以设置的政策利率施加了限制，因为立即恢复为最佳自由裁量率可能与超过阈值不兼容。