This article aims to phenomenologically examine T’oegye’s arguments on the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings, attempting a theoretical reconstruction through “founding” and “alterity”, so as to reveal the relations and differences between the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings. On the one hand, the Four Beginnings constitute a founding substratum, on the top of which the Seven Feelings may be founded. Moreover, whereas the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings share the same assumption of alterity or intersubjectivity, they differ in their emphasis on whether li (理 principle) or qi (氣 material force) shall be prioritised. The priority of principle over material force is inherent in the notion of the Four Beginnings, while for the Seven Feelings, it is the other way around. When confronted by an “other”, one will invariably face a choice to make, in “deontological consideration of the other’s interest” or “private preference”. There is an emphasis that “deontological consideration shall prevail” in the Four Beginnings, for which it is “purely good”. By way of comparison, the Seven Feelings may be affected more often than not by “private desire or preference”, for which reason it will manifest the Janus faces of being both good and evil.

中文翻译：

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托格耶关于四个开端和七个感情的论点：现象学探究

本文旨在从现象学的角度研究托格耶关于“四个起点和七个感情”的观点，尝试通过“基础”和“改变”进行理论重构，以揭示“四个起点和七个感情”之间的关系和差异。一方面，“四个起点”构成了一个创始基础，在此基础上可以建立“七情”。而且，尽管“四个开始”和“七个感觉”具有相同的关于改变或主体间性的假设，但它们在强调li（理原理）或qi（气物质力）的优先次序上有所不同。原则优先于物质力量是“四个开端”概念的固有内容，而对于“七个感觉”而言，则相反。当面对“他人”时，人们总是会面临做出选择的选择，在“道义上考虑对方的利益”或“私人偏爱”。强调在“四个起点”中“以道义上的考虑为准”，因为这是“绝对好的”。相比之下，“七种感情”受“私人欲望或偏爱”的影响可能更大，因此，它将表现出贾努斯善与恶的面孔。