Credit rating agencies have assessed the creditworthiness of issuers and debt instruments for over a century. Nevertheless, in the United States and in the European Union a first regulation of rating services was passed only at the beginning of the twenty-first century, respectively in 2006 and 2009. Statutory liability rules were later adopted in the United States with the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 and in the European Union with Regulation (EU) no 462/2013. Despite some similarities between the American and European existing discipline, significant differences still exist and pave the way for regulatory arbitrage opportunities in the ratings market. The reasons for divergence are clearly historically based and derive, in part, from the different traditions of the two legal systems. Accordingly, this article compares the evolution of the US regulatory framework and case law on the liability of rating organizations towards investors with the uniform rules adopted by the European Union since 2009, absent a comparable case law at the European level. It is argued that, in both systems, while it is easier to establish liability in case of intent, burden of proof rules generally place a significant, if not insurmountable, obstacle to damage compensation for investors.

中文翻译：

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美国和欧盟信用评级机构责任的演变：危机后的监管

信用评级机构已经对发行人和债务工具的信誉进行了一个多世纪的评估。尽管如此，美国和欧盟在2006年和2009年才分别在二十一世纪初通过了评级服务的第一条法规。后来，美国与多德2010年《法兰克法案》（Frank Act）和欧盟（EU）第462/2013号法规。尽管美国和欧洲现有准则之间存在某些相似之处，但仍然存在重大差异，这为评级市场中的监管套利机会铺平了道路。分歧的原因显然是历史原因，部分原因是两种法律制度的不同传统。因此，本文将美国评级机构对投资者责任的监管框架和判例法的演变与欧盟自2009年以来采用的统一规则进行了比较，而在欧洲却没有类似的判例法。有人认为，在这两种制度中，虽然在有意图的情况下更容易确立赔偿责任，但举证责任规则通常为投资者造成的损害赔偿构成了即使不是无法克服的重大障碍。