We analyze a hand-collected dataset of 1682 executive compensation packages at 34 firms included in the main German stock market index (DAX) for the years 2009-2017 in order to investigate the impact of the 2009 say on pay-legislation. The findings provide important insights beyond the German case, not only for the impending implementation of the revised European Shareholder Rights Directive. First, we observe that the compensation packages of management board members of Germany’s DAX30-firms are closely linked to key performance measures such as return-on-assets and size. Second, and most important for our topic, our findings suggest that it is essential to take a closer look at the contractual set-up for the compensation schemes and their structure. When we only consider the compensation packages of all board members, the hypothesis that remuneration is decreased if shareholder support for compensation schemes is low in say on pay-votes finds only weak support, if any at all. However, we find that the supervisory board is responsive to say on pay-votes when it comes to the design of compensation packages for newly entering candidates, i.e. within the binding restrictions of contract law, it reacts as envisioned by policy makers. It is a consequence of the way say on pay is supposed to work that our results are driven by the rather few pronouncedly discontent say on pay-votes in corporate Germany – only where disapproval is voiced supervisory boards have reason to change compensation packages. They leave matters unaffected where shareholders show rather strong support for the proposed schemes as is the case in most of the observations in our dataset. Yet, it is important because it informs our understanding of the channels through which say on pay works. Our observations carry over to the general analytical approach for say on pay-regimes. Any evaluation of a shareholder voice-strategy in regulating executive remuneration has to pay close attention to the limits contract law stipulates for the adaptation of existing remuneration agreements and thus has to take a medium to long-term view that ideally extends to a full turnover-period for board-members.

中文翻译：

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是否在薪资方面说？来自德国的证据

我们分析了2009-2017年德国主要股票市场指数（DAX）中34家公司的1682份高管薪酬方案的手工收集数据，以调查2009年言论对薪酬立法的影响。这些发现不仅为即将实施的修订后的《欧洲股东权利指令》提供了重要的见解，而且超越了德国的案例。首先，我们观察到德国DAX30公司董事会成员的薪酬待遇与关键绩效指标（如资产回报率和规模）密切相关。其次，对于我们的主题而言，这也是最重要的，我们的发现表明，有必要仔细研究赔偿计划的合同设置及其结构。当我们只考虑所有董事会成员的薪酬方案时，假设如果股东对薪酬计划的支持率很低（如果有投票权的话），那么薪酬就会减少，这一假设只会发现支持很弱（如果有的话）。但是，我们发现监事会在设计新入职候选人的薪酬方案时对薪水投票做出回应，即在合同法的约束范围内，它按照政策制定者的设想做出反应。工资说应该起作用的方式的结果是，我们的结果是由德国公司中很少有人对工资票说出明显的不满所驱动的–只有在有反对意见的情况下，监事会才有理由更改薪酬方案。在股东对拟议计划表现出相当强烈的支持的情况下，这些问题不会受到影响，就像我们数据集中的大多数观察结果一样。然而，这一点很重要，因为它可以使我们了解有关付费工作的渠道。我们的观察结果沿用了一般的分析方法，以说明薪酬制度。评估股东对高管薪酬的声音策略的任何评估都必须密切注意合同法规定的适用于现有薪酬协议的限制，因此必须采取中长期观点，理想情况下应扩展至全部营业额，董事会成员的任期。