The purpose of the emission trading scheme (ETS), a cost-effective reduction, can be achieved through the active participation of liable firms. Although there was a steady increase in the transaction volume in the phase 1 (2015–2017) of Korea ETS, allowance used in flexible mechanism such as banking outweighed the amount of trading. By analyzing the trading behavior of liable firms in the Phase 1 of Korea ETS, we find out the determinants impeding the cost-effective reduction through active market participation. According to our empirical result, the liable firms who perceive ETS as a burden, trust government policy continuity and forecast that allowance price would go up tend to bank remaining allowance. On the other hand, the firms who were allocated larger allowance are more likely to trade. This result shows that heavy emitters having larger allowance could have realized economies of scale in transaction cost for MRV or seeking trading partners. Thus, market liquidity will be enhanced through government’s support to reduce transaction cost for small emitters, discover clear price signal, and provide policy signals that ETS can be another business opportunity.

排放交易计划 (ETS) 的目标是具有成本效益的减排，可以通过负责任的公司的积极参与来实现。尽管韩国ETS第一阶段（2015-2017）交易量稳步增长，但银行等灵活机制中使用的配额超过了交易量。通过分析韩国ETS第一阶段责任企业的交易行为，我们找出了阻碍通过积极市场参与实现成本效益降低的决定因素。根据我们的实证结果，将 ETS 视为负担、相信政府政策连续性并预测配额价格会上涨的责任公司倾向于存入剩余配额。另一方面，分配了较大配额的公司更有可能进行交易。这一结果表明，拥有较大配额的排放大国可以在 MRV 或寻找贸易伙伴的交易成本上实现规模经济。因此，通过政府支持降低小排放者的交易成本，发现明确的价格信号，并提供政策信号，ETS 可以成为另一个商业机会，将增强市场流动性。