Coexistence of open‐source (OS) and proprietary (PP) platforms observed in several industries motivates us to study the equilibrium structure of a two‐sided market when platforms can commit to OS strategically. This paper considers a symmetric market with simultaneous arrival of content providers and hardware users, and discovers that coexistence of OS and PP platforms is the unique equilibrium outcome in which the PP platform prefers to commit to a license fee before hardware price competition. The above result delivers three contributions to the literature of two‐sided markets. First, the OS platform owns more content provision, but gets a smaller share in the hardware device market. Second, OS commitments may induce coexistence of asymmetric platforms as well as network size or price commitments do which were presented in literature. Third, social welfare increases with the numbers of OS platforms; whereas consumers’ surplus decreases with them.

中文翻译：

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开源和专有平台的共存是否可以达到均衡的结果？

在多个行业中观察到的开源（OS）平台和专有（PP）平台的共存，促使我们研究平台可以战略性地致力于OS时的双向市场均衡结构。本文考虑了一个具有内容提供商和硬件用户同时到来的对称市场，并发现OS和PP平台的共存是独特的均衡结果，其中PP平台更愿意在硬件价格竞争之前承诺支付许可费用。以上结果为双向市场的文献提供了三点贡献。首先，OS平台拥有更多的内容供应，但在硬件设备市场中所占份额却较小。其次，操作系统承诺可能会导致不对称平台以及网络规模或价格承诺的共存，这在文献中已有介绍。第三，社会福利随着OS平台数量的增加而增加；而消费者的剩余也随之减少。