We conducted a laboratory‐in‐the‐field experiment with real‐life tenants in Ethiopia to test the incentive effects of fixed wage, sharecropping, fixed rent, and ownership contracts. The experimental task resembles a common process in agricultural production. The sharecropping contract is a piece rate scheme framed as a profit‐sharing agreement. Sharecropping output was about 12 percent smaller than the fixed rent output. Surprisingly, it is statistically indistinguishable from the fixed wage output, despite substantial piece rates. This effect is driven by real‐life sharecroppers. Their sharecropping output was smaller than that of non‐sharecroppers, especially in a region where a controversial land reform took place. We argue that our subjects dislike sharecropping contracts because of the unfair profit sharing and the disputed allocation of land. Fairness concerns, therefore, may be another impediment to efficiency under the sharecropping contract.

中文翻译：

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不公平的激励措施：有关股份种植的行为​​说明

我们对埃塞俄比亚的实际租户进行了实验室实地试验，以测试固定工资，股份制，固定租金和所有权合同的激励效果。实验任务类似于农业生产中的常见过程。种植合同是一种计入利润分享协议的计件工资计划。联合作物的产量比固定租金的产量少约12％。令人惊讶的是，尽管计件工资很高，但从统计上看，它与固定工资没有区别。这种影响是由现实中的农作物驱动的。他们的农作物产量小于非农作物，特别是在发生有争议的土地改革的地区。我们认为，由于不公平的利润分配和有争议的土地分配，我们的主体不喜欢股份制合同。