In this paper, we consider a non-cooperative differential game, in which each of the two competing firms (privately) holds and manages a renewable natural resource in order to produce a homogeneous good. We suppose that each firm’s resource stock grows at a different rate, depending on environmental factors or on firms’ technical experience and skills. We find an (asymmetric) linear feedback Nash equilibrium, in which each player’s strategy depends only on its available resource stock. We then carry out both short-run and steady-state comparative static analyses, from a social welfare point of view as well.

中文翻译：

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具有不对称企业的动态私有财产资源博弈

在本文中，我们考虑了一个非合作的差分博弈，其中两个竞争公司中的每一个（私有）都持有和管理可再生自然资源，以生产同质商品。我们假设每个公司的资源存量以不同的速度增长，这取决于环境因素或公司的技术经验和技能。我们发现（非对称）线性反馈纳什均衡，其中每个参与者的策略仅取决于其可用资源存量。然后，我们还从社会福利的角度进行短期和稳态比较静态分析。