This article studies civil–military relations in defence procurement. Applying insights from the principal–agent model, we argue that decision-making about defence procurement is inherently vulnerable to agency problems. Given the technical nature of these dossiers, governments and parliaments are often heavily dependent upon military expertise, creating leeway for defence administrations to steer decision-making towards their preferences. By means of a case study of the replacement of the F-16 fighter jets in Belgium, we examine whether and how complex defence procurement dossiers allow for exploitation of expertise through strategic information management from the defence administration to the Minister of Defence. In addition, empirics reveal a to date unexplored phenomenon of agent intrusion. It captures the situation in which an agent takes a prominent formal advisory position within the decision-making apparatus of its political principal, providing additional means to outplay its information advantage over the principal in favour of its own interests.

中文翻译：

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没有翅膀？军机关系和特工入侵战斗机的采购

本文研究国防采购中的军民关系。运用委托-代理模型的见解，我们认为国防采购的决策天生就容易受到代理问题的影响。鉴于这些档案的技术性质，政府和议会通常严重依赖军事专业知识，为国防管理部门根据自己的偏好引导决策提供了余地。通过在比利时更换F-16战斗机的案例研究，我们研究了复杂的国防采购档案是否以及如何通过战略信息管理（从国防行政部门到国防部长）来利用专业知识。此外，经验还揭示了迄今为止尚未探索的代理入侵现象。