Building upon research that found that coalitions are more likely to win wars, recent work has sought to differentiate effective from ineffective coalitions. Much of this work focuses on characteristics of member states and not the coalition itself. This paper takes a first step in exploring how the structure of a coalition contributes to its performance. Specifically, coalitions vary in how much control members must transfer to the coalition. Some coalitions form weak command structures with states maintaining primary control while other coalitions form a strong centralized command. The impact of command structure on coalition performance is vital to understanding the success and failure of coalitions. Highly centralized command structures allow states to overcome the problems associated with coalition warfare and achieve victory. Empirical evidence supports this claim; the odds of victory increase as states surrender more control to the coalition. These findings provide direct advice to policy makers considering forming a coalition. The implications of this research extend to the alliance literature and the war bargaining literature, which tend to assume either that wars are dyadic or that states can seamlessly aggregate military capabilities.

基于发现联盟更有可能赢得战争的研究，最近的工作试图将有效联盟与无效联盟区分开。这项工作大部分集中在成员国的特征上，而不是联盟本身。本文迈出了探索联盟的结构如何对其绩效做出贡献的第一步。具体而言，联盟在控制成员必须转移到联盟中的数量方面有所不同。一些联盟形成了薄弱的命令结构，国家维持了主要控制权，而其他联盟则形成了强大的集中式命令。指挥结构对联盟绩效的影响对于了解联盟的成败至关重要。高度集中的指挥机构使各州能够克服与联合战有关的问题并取得胜利。经验证据支持这一说法。随着各州向联盟交出更多控制权，获胜的可能性增加。这些发现为考虑组成联盟的决策者提供了直接建议。这项研究的意义扩展到联盟文献和战争谈判文献，它们倾向于假设战争是二元的或国家可以无缝地整合军事能力。