Abstract Both terms in our title, “habit” and “generalization,” are ordinary language expressions that take a peculiar and abstract sense in Peirce’s thought. From various standpoints, the concepts denoted by these two terms prove to be fundamental for understanding Peirce’s ideas, and eventually for the further development of these ideas in the philosophy of science. My review suggests that Peirce’s thought moves toward a goal that he constantly suggests but never articulates explicitly. This unstated objective is no other than the goal of generalizing the very idea of generalization. This article demonstrates that once the notion of habit is generalized, its connotational range swells to cover such diverse instances as those of symbol, rule, propensity, and law of nature. Therefore, this expanded conception can be applied to unify previously separated strands of thought and scientific practice. These considerations lead me to speculate on the possibility of extending Peircean synechism toward a wider conception that could include the generalizing functions of ideas concerning symmetry (and symmetry breaking) and other kinds of invariance. A version of this paper was first presented at the conference “V Jornadas: Peirce en Argentina” at the Academia Nacional De Ciencias, De Buenos Aires, from August 23 to 24, 2012.

中文翻译：

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习惯与概括

摘要标题中的“习惯”和“概括”这两个术语都是普通的语言表达，在皮尔斯的思想中具有特殊和抽象的意义。从各种观点来看，这两个术语所代表的概念被证明是理解皮尔斯的思想的基础，并最终成为这些哲学思想在科学哲学中进一步发展的基础。我的评论表明，皮尔斯的思想朝着他不断提出但从未明确表达的目标迈进。这个未阐明的目标无非是概括概括概念的目标。本文证明，一旦习惯概念得到了概括，其涵义范围就会扩大，以涵盖符号，规则，倾向和自然法则等各种实例。所以，这种扩展的概念可以用于统一先前分离的思想和科学实践。这些考虑使我推测是否有可能将Peircean同步扩展到更宽泛的概念，其中可能包括有关对称性（和对称性破坏）以及其他类型不变性的概化功能。该论文的版本首次于2012年8月23日至24日在德布宜诺斯艾利斯国家科学研究院的“ V Jornadas：阿根廷的皮尔斯”会议上发表。