This article explores the relationship between executive compensation and employee voice using a panel dataset from Korean firms. It was found that the existence and rate of labour unionization are both negatively associated with executive compensation payment, and that the negative association is progressively stronger for upper percentile executive pay. Labour union existence also has a strong negative correlation with stock option use in executive compensation packages, but unionization rate does not, implying that union existence is more critical in shaping executive compensation structures than the strength of the union. Membership of large family-owned business conglomerates (chaebol), high financial risk and high employee wages are identified as channels that reinforce the negative influence of labour unions on executive compensation.

中文翻译：

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工会员工对高管薪酬的影响：来自韩国的证据

本文使用韩国公司的面板数据集探讨高管薪酬与员工意见之间的关系。结果表明，工会化的存在和率均与高管薪酬支付呈负相关，且与高管薪酬较高的负相关逐渐增强。工会的存在与高管薪酬方案中的股票期权使用也有很强的负相关，但工会化率没有，这意味着工会的存在在塑造高管薪酬结构方面比工会的实力更重要。大型家族企业集团 (chaebol) 的成员身份、高财务风险和高员工工资被认为是强化工会对高管薪酬负面影响的渠道。