Many Sub-Saharan African countries are unable to generate sufficient tax revenues for public purposes. While it is widely accepted that governments’ ability to tax is shaped by politics, the precise mechanisms through which this relationship takes place in practice remain elusive. Based on a historical analysis of four major tax reforms in Ghana from the 1850s to the late 1990s, this article captures the various ways in which taxpayers negotiate with the state in an attempt to limit the extent of taxation, especially in cases where state reciprocity falls short of what people expect. Our evidence suggests that, far from being a recent development, effective taxation in Ghana has long depended on the ability of the state to convince taxpayers that tax revenues will be used for the public benefit. A history of misappropriation of tax revenues, overt corruption, and profligacy diminished taxpayers’ support for governments’ tax efforts. More generally, the article points to the importance of understanding how tax bargaining works in practice and people’s perceptions of their governments over the long term to overcome resistance to tax reforms. (Less)

中文翻译：

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加纳的税收谈判、财政合同和财政能力：长期视角

许多撒哈拉以南非洲国家无法为公共目的产生足够的税收。虽然人们普遍认为政府的征税能力受政治影响，但这种关系在实践中发生的确切机制仍然难以捉摸。本文基于对加纳 1850 年代至 1990 年代后期四项主要税收改革的历史分析，捕捉了纳税人与国家谈判以试图限制税收范围的各种方式，特别是在国家互惠下降的情况下达不到人们的期望。我们的证据表明，加纳的有效税收远远不是最近的发展，长期以来一直取决于国家说服纳税人税收将用于公共利益的能力。挪用税收的历史，公然腐败和挥霍无度削弱了纳税人对政府税收工作​​的支持。更一般地说，文章指出了解税收谈判在实践中如何运作以及人们对政府长期看法的重要性，以克服税收改革的阻力。（较少的）