ABSTRACT

Studies of environmental enforcement in the United States focus on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) civil enforcement actions. We develop a fuller understanding of why the agency enforces through analysis of how and why they use criminal enforcement. We build a comprehensive dataset on the history of the EPA’s criminal enforcement investigations and related prosecutions, 1983–2019. Through content analysis of the agency’s case summaries, we analyze 2,588 cases to explain criminal prosecution outcomes, contrasting organizational culture, transaction costs, and principal-agent explanations for agency behavior. We find that an agency culture focusing on deterrence and punishment of more serious crimes drives outcomes more than costs or pressure. Our findings inform the ongoing debate concerning why the EPA enforces the law and how its organizational prerogatives persist in complex political environments.

摘要

美国环境执法的研究集中在美国环境保护署 (EPA) 的民事执法行动上。我们通过分析他们使用刑事执法的方式和原因，更全面地了解该机构为何执法。我们建立了一个关于 1983 年至 2019 年美国环保署刑事执法调查和相关起诉历史的综合数据集。通过对代理案件摘要的内容分析，我们分析了 2,588 起案件，以解释刑事诉讼结果、对比组织文化、交易成本以及代理行为的委托代理解释。我们发现，专注于威慑和惩罚更严重犯罪的机构文化比成本或压力更能驱动结果。