Abstract

We explore the effects of competitive incentives and of their time horizon on the evolution of both asset prices and trading activity in experimental asset markets. We compare (i) a no-bonus treatment; (ii) a short-term bonus treatment in which bonuses are assigned to the best performers at the end of each trading period; (iii) a long-term bonus treatment in which bonuses are assigned to the best performers at the end of the 15 periods of the market. We find that the existence of bonus contracts does not increase the likelihood of bubbles but it affects their severity, depending on the time horizon of bonuses. Markets with long-term bonus contracts experience lower price deviations and a lower turnover of assets than markets with either no bonuses or long-term bonus contracts. Short-term bonus contracts increase price deviations but only when markets include a higher share of male traders. At the individual level, the introduction of bonus contracts increases the trading activity of males, probably due to their higher competitiveness.

摘要

我们探索竞争性激励措施及其时间跨度对实验性资产市场中资产价格和交易活动的演变的影响。我们比较（i）无奖励待遇；（ii）短期奖金待遇，其中奖金在每个交易期结束时分配给表现最佳的人；（iii）长期红利待遇，其中在市场的15个时期结束时将奖金分配给表现最佳的人。我们发现，奖金合同的存在并不会增加出现泡沫的可能性，但是会影响奖金的严重程度，具体取决于奖金的时间范围。与没有奖金或长期奖金合同的市场相比，具有长期奖金合同的市场经历的价格偏差和资产周转率较低。短期红利合约会增加价格偏差，但前提是市场中男性交易者的份额更高。在个人层面上，奖金合同的引入增加了男性的交易活动，这可能是由于男性具有更高的竞争力。