The sufficiency view holds that justice requires that people have enough, that is, that they achieve a level of well-being postulated as adequate. Recently, the sufficientarian view has received numerous criticisms, mostly concerning its disregard for inequalities above the threshold (or upper threshold, in the case of multilevel sufficientarianism) and the arbitrariness of the threshold. A particular criticism raised by Lasse Nielsen comes from within the sufficiency view and states that sufficientarianism fares badly in regard to our intuitions that the well-off have more duties, even in societies where there is no absolute deficiency. This article represents a rejoinder to that criticism, showing that a properly construed multilevel sufficiency view employing capabilities as its metric is not vulnerable to what Lasse Nielsen calls the unequally distributed burdens objection. Nonetheless, Nielsen’s objection captures the important insight that how duties are distributed matters even in such societies in which no one falls under a certain threshold. My claim is that one way that this can be achieved is by incorporating limitarian considerations into the sufficientarian project.

中文翻译：

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从自身中拯救足够的主义

充分性观点认为，正义要求人们拥有足够的东西，也就是说，他们必须达到假定的足够程度的幸福感。近来，关于富裕主义的观点受到了无数批评，主要是关于无视阈值以上的不平等（在多层次的富裕主义的情况下为上限）以及阈值的任意性。拉塞尔·尼尔森（Lasse Nielsen）提出的一种特别批评来自于自给自足的观点，并指出，就我们的直觉而言，即使在没有绝对缺陷的社会中，富裕者的富裕主义也要承担更多责任。本文代表了对该批评的反对，这表明，以能力为度量标准的经过正确解释的多层次充分性视图不容易受到拉塞尔·尼尔森（Lasse Nielsen）所谓的不平等分配负担的反对。尽管如此，尼尔森的异议仍然抓住了一个重要的见解，即即使在这样的社会中，没有人处于某个特定的门槛之下，职责的分配方式也很重要。我的主张是，可以做到这一点的一种方法是将限制因素纳入到充分计划中。