This article outlines a novel philosophical position according to which people can (a) value the continued survival of humanity, and (b) oppose procreation on moral grounds. While these two propositions may appear contradictory, they need not be: life-extension technologies could enable members of a “final” human generation to live indefinitely long lives and, therefore, to avoid biological extinction. I call this position no-extinction anti-natalism. After exploring a range of arguments for (a) and (b), I turn to various challenges associated with attaining “functional immortality”. These include whether procreation can be morally justified until life-extension technologies become available, as well as whether personal identity issues associated with attaining functional immortality problematise the anti-natalist component of my position. I conclude that this view ought to be taken seriously by those who believe that procreation is immoral.

中文翻译：

---

反纳粹主义者可以反对人类灭绝吗？伤害效益不对称，人员上载和人类增强

本文概述了一种新的哲学立场，据此人们可以（a）珍视人类的持续生存，并且（b）反对出于道德理由进行生殖。尽管这两个命题可能看起来是矛盾的，但它们不一定是：延长寿命的技术可以使“最终”人类世代无限长寿，从而避免生物灭绝。我称这个立场是消灭反种族主义。在探讨了（a）和（b）的一系列论证之后，我转向与实现“功能永生”相关的各种挑战。这些包括在生命延长技术可用之前，是否可以在道德上证明生育是合理的，以及与获得功能永生有关的个人身份问题是否使我的立场中的反犹太主义成分成问题。