ABSTRACT

Insurgencies are routinely conceptualised using a binary opposition between states and rebels. However, this neglects the complexity of their interaction, especially their collaboration. Although rebel-state collaboration is found throughout the history of insurgency, we lack a full explanation of why it occurs. This article endeavours to take the first step in developing a comprehensive theory by analysing rebel-state collaboration in two heuristic case studies: Afghanistan and Syria. Through process tracing, we find four mechanisms that can explain collaboration: 1) to prevent a costly military stalemate, 2) to gain or maintain legitimacy, 3) because external threats incentivise a mutually beneficial alliance, and 4) because both have to operate under the constraints of the pre-existing political economy. The relative weight of each varies, reflecting the fluid and contextual nature of wartime political orders. Contrasting with more popular explanations, we argue rebels and states are willing to collaborate even when the other benefits too, providing they believe their relative gains would be higher than their opponents, or the costs of competing would be too large. In providing a fuller explanation of rebel-state collaboration, we advocate a rethink about how to capture and analyse the complex and dynamic interactions between rebels and states.

摘要

叛乱通常使用国家和叛乱者之间的二元对立来概念化。然而，这忽略了他们互动的复杂性，尤其是他们的合作。尽管在整个叛乱历史中都发现了叛乱国家合作，但我们缺乏对其发生原因的完整解释。本文试图通过分析两个启发式案例研究中的反叛国家合作，迈出发展综合理论的第一步：阿富汗和叙利亚。通过过程追踪，我们发现了四种可以解释合作的机制：1) 防止代价高昂的军事僵局，2) 获得或维持合法性，3) 因为外部威胁激励互利联盟，以及 4) 因为两者都必须在预先存在的政治经济的约束。每个的相对权重各不相同，反映战时政治秩序的流动性和背景性。与更流行的解释相反，我们认为反叛者和国家愿意合作，即使对方也受益，前提是他们相信自己的相对收益会高于对手，或者竞争成本太大。在对叛军-国家合作提供更全面的解释时，我们提倡重新思考如何捕捉和分析叛军与国家之间复杂而动态的互动。