ABSTRACT Under what conditions are cyber-weapons effective in nuclear counter-proliferation? With continued interest in nuclear proliferation professed by Iran, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia, a discussion of the effectiveness of counter-proliferation measures remains relevant. Cyber-attacks as military option in a state-on-state conflict still requires additional corroborating evidence to make conclusions about its long-term effectiveness. This work analyses the general applicability of cyber-weapons and their usefulness in nuclear counter-proliferation. Through a comparative case study of Operation Orchard, Stuxnet, and recent “Left-of-Launch” operations against North Korea, the essay finds that cyber-operations are not particularly effective against nuclear programmes that are in the later stages of their development. They can disrupt and delay a nuclear programme temporarily, if the attack remains clandestine, but cannot halt nuclear proliferation all together. However, effectiveness increases if they are used in combination with conventional weapons. The article addresses a topic of interest to national-level decision-makers: whether cyber-operations can and should play a role in nuclear counter-proliferation.

中文翻译：

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核反扩散中的网络武器

摘要 在什么条件下网络武器在核反扩散中有效？随着伊朗、朝鲜和沙特阿拉伯对核扩散的持续兴趣，对反扩散措施有效性的讨论仍然具有相关性。网络攻击作为国与国冲突中的军事选择仍然需要额外的确凿证据才能对其长期有效性做出结论。这项工作分析了网络武器的普遍适用性及其在核反扩散中的有用性。通过对果园行动、震网行动和最近针对朝鲜的“左发射”行动的比较案例研究，本文发现网络行动对处于发展后期的核计划并不是特别有效。如果攻击仍然是秘密的，他们可以暂时中断和推迟核计划，但不能完全阻止核扩散。但是，如果将它们与常规武器结合使用，则效率会提高。这篇文章讨论了一个国家级决策者感兴趣的话题：网络行动是否能够而且应该在核反扩散中发挥作用。