Analyzing Russia’s VOSTOK 2018 strategic level field-exercise (or “strategic manoeuvers”) in the West from a Western perspective is hard. A key reason for this is that Western and Russian perspectives on war and the use of military force have grown apart. By this, Russia is still focused on traditional notions of mass, i.e. massed troops and firepower brought to bear on the enemy to achieve tactical/operational victory. Conversely, most Western states have turned their thinking to effect precision engagement, using high-tech situational awareness and C4 capabilities with small(er), professional and highly lethal forces. For the last 25 years, much of the Western focus on warfare has highlighted force-protection and the avoidance of collateral damage in expeditionary operations that have little to do with vital national security interests. This deviates completely from the Russian perspective: causing maximal casualties and destruction in order to prevail in the battlefield (to wit: observe Eastern Ukraine). In short, today the very expensive Western precision warfare meets attrition warfare and decisive battles would enjoin to produce the ultimate use of violence. Understanding Russia’s military formations –Guards Tank Army and many Combined Arms Armies – is a difficult task in particular for European military analysts since most European states have during the last 25 years disbanded army-, corps – and divisionlevel units. In fact, to be truthful, even manning a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) these days would be a struggle for many Western states. Battalion-based battlegroups have been the way to go within Europe, as operations have been planned and executed in the name of military crisis-management, humanitarian interventions, counter-terrorist operations, and counter-insurgency operations. In short, many Western analysts have difficulties in comprehending one state (Russia) fielding tens of thousands of troops in field exercises – and doing so every year. Within the West it takes NATO – a military alliance of 29 states – to organize something even resembling the size of what we witnessed in VOSTOK-2018. In VOSTOK-2018 – as in any other recent Russian strategic level field-exercise – it is noteworthy that C2 arrangements included the top political level and moved down to the units in the operational – and tactical-levels. Based on the number of participating troops in the exercise, this meant orchestrating operations of an army/army corps level unit. Even though Russia still lags behind the Western states in the level of available C4-technology,

中文翻译：

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VOSTOK-2018 的教训：自由发挥机动被高估，任务指挥需要受到限制

从西方的角度分析俄罗斯在西方的 VOSTOK 2018 战略层面的实地演习（或“战略演习”）是很困难的。造成这种情况的一个关键原因是西方和俄罗斯对战争和使用军事力量的看法已经分歧。因此，俄罗斯仍然专注于传统的大规模概念，即集结部队和火力打击敌人以取得战术/作战胜利。相反，大多数西方国家已将其思想转向实现精确交战，使用高科技态势感知和 C4 能力以及小型（呃）专业和高杀伤力部队。在过去的 25 年里，西方对战争的大部分关注都强调了在与重要国家安全利益无关的远征行动中保护部队和避免附带损害。这完全背离了俄罗斯的观点：为了在战场上取胜而造成最大的伤亡和破坏（即：观察乌克兰东部）。简而言之，今天非常昂贵的西方精确战遇到消耗战，决战将导致最终使用暴力。了解俄罗斯的军事编队——近卫坦克军和许多联合武装部队——对于欧洲军事分析人员来说是一项艰巨的任务，因为大多数欧洲国家在过去 25 年中解散了陆军、军和师级单位。事实上，说实话，对于许多西方国家来说，如今即使配备一个旅战斗队（BCT）也将是一场斗争。以营为基础的战斗群一直是欧洲内部的通行方式，因为行动是以军事危机管理、人道主义干预、反恐行动和反叛乱行动的名义计划和执行的。简而言之，许多西方分析家难以理解一个国家（俄罗斯）每年都派出数万军队参加野战演习。在西方，需要北约——一个由 29 个国家组成的军事联盟——来组织一些甚至类似于我们在 VOSTOK-2018 中目睹的规模的事情。在 VOSTOK-2018 中——就像在俄罗斯最近的任何其他战略层面的实地演习中一样——值得注意的是，C2 安排包括最高政治层面，并下移到作战和战术层面的单位。根据参加演习的部队人数，这意味着协调陆军/陆军军级单位的行动。