ABSTRACT

Current debates on recognition and domination tend to be characterized by two polarized positions. Where the “anti-recognition” camp views recognition as a tool for establishing and reproducing relations of power, the “pro-recognition” camp conceives it as a way for dominated individuals and social groups to lay stake to intersubjective relations that are more just. At first glance, Honneth’s normative theory of recognition and Bourdieu’s critical sociology of domination also divide along these lines. Honneth takes the pro-recognition stance, criticizing the French sociologist for adopting a “fragmented” conception of the social world that ignores the “moral consensus” underlying each claim for mutual recognition. In contrast, Bourdieu accuses the German philosopher of endorsing an “enchanted” view of the social world that misrecognizes the way that recognition perpetuates symbolic domination. However, through a close and nuanced reading of their works, this article suggests that, in spite of this difference, Honneth’s and Bourdieu’s theories nonetheless converge on the idea that recognition is neither “good” nor “bad” per se, but “structurally ambiguous” in its relations to symbolic domination.

摘要

当前关于承认和统治的辩论往往以两个两极化立场为特征。在“反承认”阵营将承认视为建立和再现权力关系的工具的地方，“赞成承认”阵营则将其视为占主导地位的个人和社会团体为更公正的主体间关系争取利益的一种方式。乍一看，霍内斯的认可标准理论和布迪厄的批判统治社会学也沿这条线分裂。霍内斯（Honneth）采取亲承认的立场，批评法国社会学家对社会世界采取了“碎片化”的概念，而忽略了相互承认的每项主张背后的“道德共识”。相比之下，布迪厄（Bourdieu）指责德国哲学家赞同对社会世界的“迷惑”观点，这种观点错误地认识到承认使象征性统治长期存在的方式。然而，通过对他们作品的细致入微的阅读，本文表明，尽管存在这种差异，但霍内斯和布迪厄的理论仍然基于这样的观点，即认可既不是“好”也不是“坏”。本身，但在与象征性统治的关系上却“结构上模棱两可”。