ABSTRACT The peace-building literature widely frames corruption as a threat to the stability of states transitioning from armed conflict. Underlying this framing are liberal assumptions on the institutions required for long-term stability, to which corruption is seen as necessarily detrimental. In this article, I add to an emergent literature critical of this framing by examining the long-term impacts of corruption on local-level stability in Ghorahi, Nepal. Drawing on a new dataset of 89 interviews, I demonstrate the stabilising consequences of corruption on two key aspects of Nepal’s post-2006 transition. First, I show that elite-level corruption arising from the transformation of the Maoist insurgency into the political mainstream has inadvertently contributed to the social reintegration of rank and file ex-combatants. Second, I show how a corrupt elite network in local government contributed to the cooperation between political parties – including the emerging post-conflict Maoist party. These elements broaden the evidence for the stabilising consequences of corruption, which is largely focused on the effects of elite-led patronage and coping economies during episodes of conflict.

中文翻译：

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腐败对尼泊尔冲突后过渡的稳定影响

摘要建设和平文献广泛地将腐败视为对从武装冲突过渡的国家稳定的威胁。这种框架的基础是对长期稳定所需要的体制的自由假设，腐败被认为对它们必然是有害的。在本文中，我研究了腐败对尼泊尔Ghorahi地方级稳定的长期影响，从而增加了对此框架的批评。利用89个访谈的新数据集，我证明了腐败对尼泊尔2006年后过渡时期的两个关键方面的稳定影响。首先，我表明，由毛派叛乱转变为政治主流而引起的精英级腐败无意中促成了前战斗人员和社会重新融入社会。第二，我展示了地方政府中腐败的精英网络如何促进政党之间的合作，包括新兴的冲突后毛派政党。这些因素扩大了腐败稳定作用的证据，腐败的后果主要集中在冲突期间由精英领导的光顾和应对经济的影响。