Abstract The United Kingdom considered using the PRISM sodium-cooled fast reactor as a disposition option for its civilian plutonium from reprocessed MAGNOX and Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor spent fuel. This article assesses the plutonium disposition capabilities of the PRISM reactor for the U.K. stockpile. The article first describes how the stockpile was created. It then provides a simulation of reactor burn-up, the resultant isotopic compositions of PRISM spent fuel are simulated and the dose rates of that fuel. Dose rates greater than 1 Sv/h at 1 meter from the fuel were assumed to establish “proliferation resistance” and would constitute a radiation barrier to proliferators. Results suggest that the U.K. stockpile could be irradiated to that proliferation resistance target in 31.3 years, using two 840 MWth PRISM cores operating at a 30 MWd/kgHM burnup rate. By the time all the U.K. plutonium has been irradiated, however a fraction of the PRISM spent fuel will have decayed below the proliferation resistance target. Thus, even though in 2019 PRISM was removed from consideration by the U.K. government because it is not expected to be available for that use for another 20 years, this paper concludes that should PRISM become available earlier it would still be a poor choice for plutonium disposition.

中文翻译：

---

评估 PRISM 反应堆作为英国钚库存的处置选择

摘要 英国考虑使用 PRISM 钠冷快堆作为其后处理 MAGNOX 和先进气冷堆乏燃料民用钚的处置选项。本文评估了 PRISM 反应堆对英国库存的钚处置能力。文章首先描述了库存是如何创建的。然后提供对反应堆燃尽的模拟，模拟 PRISM 乏燃料的合成同位素组成以及该燃料的剂量率。假设距燃料 1 米处的剂量率大于 1 Sv/h，可建立“防扩散”，并将构成对扩散器的辐射屏障。结果表明，英国库存可以在 31.3 年内达到防扩散目标，使用两个以 30 MWd/kgHM 燃耗率运行的 840 MWth PRISM 核心。到所有英国钚都被辐照时，但是 PRISM 乏燃料的一小部分将衰减到防扩散目标以下。因此，即使在 2019 年 PRISM 被英国政府从考虑中排除，因为它预计在另外 20 年内无法用于该用途，但本文得出的结论是，如果 PRISM 更早可用，它仍然是钚处置的糟糕选择.