ABSTRACT

In 1973 Sweden entered into a free-trade agreement with the EEC. This meant that the EEC principle of prohibition of cartels met with the Swedish principle of abuse. Paper production was heavily cartelised in Sweden and Scandinavian export cartels exercised a strong influence over EEC markets. The problem is analysed in terms of legitimacy – how did the Swedish actors make their claims legitimate? When analysing the arguments used in the negotiations it becomes clear that the Swedish negotiators claimed that paper cartels and no tariffs provided more general utility whereas the EEC argument was that cartels were principally wrong and that the EEC utility was more important than the potential general utility. Since Sweden did not have the upper hand in the discussions the outcome became that the Scandinavian export cartels were formally dismantled and free trade for paper products had to wait for 11 years. When it comes to the actual effects, Swedish paper export could continue in much the same way as before. A process initiated by EC against the Scandinavian newspaper cartels ended up in a compromise founded on a common skepticism towards North American producers.

摘要

1973年，瑞典与EEC签订了自由贸易协定。这意味着欧洲经济共同体禁止卡特尔原则与瑞典的滥用原则相吻合。瑞典的纸张生产大量卡特尔化，斯堪的纳维亚的出口卡特尔对EEC市场产生了很大影响。从合法性方面分析了这个问题–瑞典演员如何使他们的主张合法化？在分析谈判中使用的论点时，很明显瑞典谈判代表声称纸制卡特尔和无关税提供了更多的通用性，而EEC的论点是卡特尔原则上是错误的，EEC的实用性比潜在的通用性更重要。由于瑞典在讨论中没有优势，结果是斯堪的纳维亚出口卡特尔被正式拆除，纸制品的自由贸易必须等待11年。说到实际效果，瑞典的纸张出口可能会以与以前相同的方式继续。欧共体发起的针对斯堪的纳维亚报纸卡特尔的程序最终以对北美生产商的普遍怀疑为基础，达成了妥协。