ABSTRACT The article presents an attempt to use the logical theory of Dignāga (480?–540?) to address the critique leveled against the treatment of “truth” as an unattainable ideal in postmodern/poststructuralist philosophy. Dignāga has famously endorsed the Buddhist critique of language as an imperfect tool to articulate valid statements about reality, but he has also shown how double negation can be used to make limited positive statements by denying their opposites. In practice, this method can be used for the development of ethical concepts that can be shared between parties who would not agree, for example, on a positive definition of “justice,” but would nonetheless all consent to characterize certain practices as unjust.

中文翻译：

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后现代理论与真理：和解的尝试

摘要 本文尝试使用 Dignāga (480?–540?) 的逻辑理论来解决对将“真理”视为后现代/后结构主义哲学中无法实现的理想的批评。Dignāga 著名地认可佛教对语言的批评，认为它是一种表达关于现实的有效陈述的不完美工具，但他也展示了如何通过否定对立面来使用双重否定来做出有限的积极陈述。在实践中，这种方法可用于发展伦理概念，这些概念可以在各方之间共享，例如，不同意“正义”的积极定义，但仍然同意将某些做法定性为不正义。