Abstract

This article demonstrates that whistleblowing often receives little attention in public administration due to ambivalence regarding administrative roles held by public administrators, the fluid scalar chain and horizontal linkages, and competitive and intricate public, organisational and private interests. Drawing on comparative analysis to elucidate the broader scope of anti-corruption reforms and whistleblowing in public administration, the article explores the influence of the administrative culture on the relationship between whistleblowing behaviours and implementation of anti-corruption reforms in public administration in Kenya. It illustrates how bureaucratic oversight mechanisms such as internal auditing procedures and ethical guidelines tend to underperform where administrative environments largely feature autocratic bureaucratic authority, parochial management styles and centralised decision-making processes. Despite the functional specialty of public institutions, these cultural composites potentially elicit administrative behaviours that generally make whistleblowing anti-organisational, anti-social and an outright illegality in public administration. The absence of whistleblowing legislation or weak whistleblowing laws exacerbate these conditions. Whistleblowing becomes even more complex at the local-state level as social networks and working groups tend to be strengthened by the collectivist associational culture in public administration. Consequently, non-performance of anti-corruption reforms were found to stem from the collective chastisement of whistleblowing practices in public organisations in Kenya. Furthermore, institutional deficits typical in local-state administration seemingly made it riskier for potential whistleblowers to come forth, mainly attendant to loose and inconsistent legislation on corruption. Therefore, to enhance whistleblowing, there is a need to insulate potential whistleblowers from legal retaliation, including cultural retaliations that come in forms of emotional and professional ‘attacks’.

摘要

本文表明，由于公共行政人员所担任的行政角色、流动的标量链和横向联系以及竞争性和复杂的公共、组织和私人利益的矛盾性，举报在公共行政中往往很少受到关注。本文通过比较分析阐明公共行政中反腐败改革和举报的更广泛范围，探讨行政文化对肯尼亚公共行政中举报行为与反腐败改革实施之间关系的影响。它说明了内部审计程序和道德准则等官僚监督机制如何在行政环境主要以专制官僚权威、狭隘管理风格和集中决策过程为特征的情况下往往表现不佳。尽管公共机构的功能特殊，但这些文化组合可能会引发行政行为，这些行为通常会使举报在公共行政中成为反组织、反社会和完全违法的行为。缺乏举报立法或薄弱的举报法律加剧了这些情况。由于公共行政中的集体主义协会文化往往会加强社交网络和工作组，因此在地方州一级，举报变得更加复杂。最后，发现反腐败改革的不执行源于肯尼亚公共组织对举报行为的集体惩罚。此外，地方国家行政机构中典型的制度缺陷似乎使潜在的告密者出现的风险更大，主要是由于腐败立法松散且前后矛盾。因此，为了加强举报，有必要使潜在的举报人免受法律报复，包括以情感和职业“攻击”形式出现的文化报复。地方国家行政机构中典型的体制缺陷似乎使潜在的举报人出现的风险更大，主要是由于有关腐败的松散和不一致的立法。因此，为了加强举报，有必要使潜在的举报人免受法律报复，包括以情感和职业“攻击”形式出现的文化报复。地方国家行政机构中典型的体制缺陷似乎使潜在的举报人出现的风险更大，主要是由于有关腐败的松散和不一致的立法。因此，为了加强举报，有必要使潜在的举报人免受法律报复，包括以情感和职业“攻击”形式出现的文化报复。