Abstract This research develops a model of optimal political expenditures and shows how money inevitably controls government leaders, subject only to a single constraint relating to negative public reaction. The paper demonstrates theoretically why many businesses do not make such investments despite abnormally high returns from the expended political capital. In particular, firms with less economic resources optimally recognise that they can successfully participate in the political process only in consortium with the dominant players of mutual interests to influence broader government policies. The largest corporations are therefore able to buy government power with a minimal political outlay.

中文翻译：

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优化政治支出以购买政府权力的模型

摘要这项研究建立了一个最佳政治支出模型，并显示了金钱如何不可避免地控制政府领导人，而只受到与负面公众反应有关的单一约束。本文从理论上说明了为什么尽管花费的政治资本获得了异常高的回报，但许多企业仍不进行此类投资。特别是，经济资源较少的公司最佳地认识到，只有与共同利益的主要参与者联合起来才能影响广泛的政府政策，他们才能成功地参与政治进程。因此，最大的公司能够以最小的政治支出购买政府的权力。