Abstract This study examines the association between government contracts and firms' use of trade credit. Firms with government contracts may demand less trade credit because of their lower operational risk, higher firm performance, stronger capacity to generate internal funds, and better access to other sources of financing. On the other hand, government contractors could receive more trade credit extensions from suppliers. We examine a sample of U.S. listed firms from 2000 to 2016 and find that firms with government contracts have a lower level of trade credit. We also find that government contractors make quicker payments for trade credit contracts than other firms. Moreover, we provide empirical evidence of government contractors' lower levels of operational risk and higher firm performance, which may enable government contractors to generate adequate internal funds for their operations or to obtain other forms of financing at a lower cost and thus lower their demand for trade credit. Incremental to prior research, our study suggests that having government contracts is one of the factors determining trade credit and firms' financing decisions.

中文翻译：

---

政府合同和贸易信贷

摘要本研究探讨了政府合同与企业使用贸易信贷之间的关联。拥有政府合同的公司可能会要求较少的贸易信贷，因为它们的运营风险较低，公司绩效更高，产生内部资金的能力更强以及获得其他融资渠道的机会更大。另一方面，政府承包商可以从供应商处获得更多的贸易信贷延期。我们研究了2000年至2016年间美国上市公司的样本，发现带有政府合同的公司的贸易信贷水平较低。我们还发现，与其他公司相比，政府承包商为贸易信贷合同支付的付款更快。此外，我们提供了经验证据，证明了政府承包商的运营风险水平较低，企业绩效较高，这可能使政府承包商能够为其运营筹集足够的内部资金，或者以较低的成本获得其他形式的融资，从而降低他们对贸易信贷的需求。与以前的研究相比，我们的研究表明，拥有政府合同是决定贸易信贷和企业融资决策的因素之一。