Abstract

With this paper I would like to highlight the juridical nature of what De Castro calls, in opposition to the Cartesian myth of method, the method of myth. The myth is characterized by the impossibility and at the same time the unavoidability of the argument about its own origin. Even moving from the immanentist dimension of myth, we are overwhelmed by the desire to turn around and look for our own origin, which vanishes in the same way as Eurydice with Orpheus. The problem of origin, which raises and doesn’t solve this ambiguity, is the problem of law, law to be understood as literature. The metaphor of Orpheus within this literary movement may be used to criticize the legal knowledge from its middle, and not only conceptually. We need a duality of register to bypass the conceptuality and this is why the survey that I propose will be developed on the one side with Deleuze and on the other hand with some elements taken from Shakespeare, Cervantes and Pessoa.

摘要

在这篇论文中，我想强调德卡斯特罗所称的法律性质，与笛卡尔方法的神话相对，神话的方法。神话的特点是不可能，同时又是不可避免的关于其起源的争论。即使从神话的内在主义维度出发，我们也被转过身去寻找我们自己的起源的欲望所压倒，就像欧律狄刻与俄耳甫斯一样消失了。起源问题，提出并没有解决这种歧义，是法律的问题，法律被理解为文学. 这场文学运动中俄耳甫斯的比喻可以用来从中间批评法律知识，而不仅仅是概念上的批评。我们需要一种双重的语域来绕过概念性，这就是为什么我提议的调查一方面是与德勒兹一起发展，另一方面是从莎士比亚、塞万提斯和佩索阿中提取的一些元素。