ABSTRACT

Heidegger’s remarks about language in Being and Time do not constitute a comprehensive theory of language. Hubert Dreyfus, William Blattner and Mark Wrathall each propose a derivativist reading of these remarks. Derivativism is the theory that language is derivative of a pre-linguistically articulated experience of the world – but derivativism is not quite right. It does not account adequately for the relationship between the disclosedness of being-in-the-world and what Heidegger calls discourse [Rede]. I claim that although language has its ontological foundation in the constitution of disclosedness, this does not mean that language is prefigured by a way of being-in-the-world that is existentially prelinguistic. Finally, I develop Wrathall’s claims about disclosedness into a more palatable account of the relationship between discourse and language, which I test against Heidegger’s claims about the relationship between discourse and language in Being and Time.

摘要

海德格尔在《存在与时间》中关于语言的评论并不构成一个全面的语言理论。Hubert Dreyfus、William Blattner 和 Mark Wrathall 都提出了对这些评论的衍生解读。派生主义是这样一种理论，即语言是从语言之前的世界经验中衍生出来的——但派生主义并不完全正确。它没有充分说明在世的公开性与海德格尔所谓的话语之间的关系 [ Rede]。我声称，虽然语言在公开性的构成中有其本体论基础，但这并不意味着语言是通过一种存在于前语言的存在于世界的方式来预示的。最后，我将 Wrathall 关于公开性的主张发展为对话语与语言之间关系的更可口的描述，我将其与海德格尔在《存在与时间》中关于话语与语言之间关系的主张进行对比。